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INTRODUCTION
Current child support laws are based on false assumptions about fami-
lies that fail to reflect family complexity and the realities of parenting.  The
current model assumes a financially secure, heterosexual, married, cohabitat-
ing couple that separates without subsequently forming new unions or be-
coming parents again.  This model — although almost always inaccurate —
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is even more distanced from the realities of today.1  In particular, child sup-
port laws ignore “multiple families” — families in which at least one parent
has had another child with a different partner.2  Consequently, federal child
support laws fail to meet their self-described goals, and fail particularly
acutely for poor families.3  Because of this fundamental disconnect between
child support laws and the realities of parenting, child support policy should
be reenvisioned and a new theory of child support should be implemented.
This Article proposes a new theory of child support, limited equalization,
which makes an explicit policy choice in favor of existing families.
There has been little reevaluation of the stated goals of child support
law since they were first implemented thirty years ago.4  The stated goals —
fiscal savings, children’s economic well-being, and parental involvement —
have not been achieved and are increasingly unlikely to be achieved because
they are based on flawed assumptions that do not reflect current family
demographics.  In particular, federal child support laws ignore the way that
children in multiple families compete for the limited resources of their par-
ents, leaving states without guidance for determining the support interests of
children living in multiple families.
The two primary ways to allocate child support among families are
“first family first” or “equalization.”5  In “first family first” policy, the first
1 See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REV. 879, 911–12 (1984) (noting that disputes concerning disrupted families are resolved
by applying the norms of nuclear families); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “It All Depends
on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a Communitarian Theory of the “Nontraditional”
Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 570 (1996) (“Today, far from representing a radical
fringe, nonnuclear families have become the norm for a generation.”); see also Richard
F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear Fami-
lies in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 MO. L. REV. 527, 550 (2001)
(writing that “individual privacy rights are influenced by concern for promoting the inter-
ests of nuclear families”).
2 In this Article, I use the terms multiple families, blended families, and complex
families interchangeably.  Typically, “multiple families” refers to families where one or
both parents have had new children with other partners, often multiple new partners;
“blended families” refers to families where one parent has acquired new parenting re-
sponsibilities as a result of a relationship with a new partner; and “complex families”
refers to non-nuclear families, often with an extended parenting network.  This Article
focuses on families where at least one parent has a new child with a different partner.
Although there may be differences in the family formation among complex, blended, and
multiple families, the substantive and theoretical conclusions reached in this Article
likely apply to all.
3 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
4 See discussion infra Parts II–III discussing the legislative histories and strategic
plans that fail to reexamine the underlying principles of federal involvement in child
support.
5 Within this framework, children are characterized as existing children and subse-
quent children.  “Existing children” are children to whom a support obligation is already
owed; “subsequent children” are those born after the existing children; and the child in
the first or earlier family is a “prior” child.  See D.A. Rollie Thompson, The Second
Family Conundrum in Child Support, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 227, 249 (2001).
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family receives an award that is not reduced when new children are born.6
The second way to allocate child support among families is through “equali-
zation” policy, which calls for “equal treatment” of all the children of a
particular parent.7  This Article argues that the federal government should
provide instructions on balancing these competing interests to ensure uni-
form policy goals and more consistent application of child support laws.
This Article examines who should bear the cost of a parent’s decision to
have more children, particularly where there are limited resources, and de-
velops a new theory of child support, limited equalization.  Motivated by the
current failures of federal involvement in child support, limited equalization
gives states explicit guidance in developing child support guidelines while
reenvisioning the focal points of child support policy.8  Limited equalization
recognizes modern demographics of families and expands upon the limited
doctrines of duty of support and parenthood.  It addresses the needs of chil-
dren in low-income and multiple families and provides a mechanism to real-
istically account for families’ situations in calculating child support awards.
When a choice must be made among multiple families, limited equalization
favors first families because of the harmful effects of a reduction in child
support.
Against the backdrop of these goals, limited equalization has five points
of focus for child support: (1) making an explicit policy choice about sup-
porting multiple families, with a preference for existing families; (2) recog-
nizing the demographics of the families that need child support; (3)
expanding the definition of parenting and the duty of support; (4) increasing
attention to poverty prevention; and (5) increasing attention to gender
equality.
Part I of this Article explains the importance of federal child support
laws and their failure to account for modern demographics, Part II reviews
the existing federal child support laws, Part III identifies the explicit goals of
federal child support law, Part IV critiques the goals of federal child support
law, and Part V examines issues of family complexity in state child support
guidelines.  Finally, Part VI identifies key issues in forming and implement-
ing limited equalization as a new theory of child support.
6 LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
§ 3.04(a) (1996).  The American Law Institute Principles also require the subtraction of
prior child support obligations from the obligor’s income. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.14(3) (2000)
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (limiting the reduction to payments that are actually made).
Judicial deference is ordinarily given to existing support orders for children born from
prior relationships.
7 Martha Minow, How Should We Think About Child Support Obligations?, in FA-
THERS UNDER FIRE: THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 302, 309 (Irwin
Garfinkel, Sara S. McLanahan, Daniel R. Meyer & Judith A. Seltzer eds., 2001).
8 Although many scholars have addressed the failures of child support policy, none
have thoroughly examined multiple families or the relationship between family complex-
ity and the goals of federal involvement in child support.
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I. CHILD SUPPORT IS IMPORTANT TO FAMILIES, YET THE LAWS FAIL TO
REFLECT THE ACTUAL COMPOSITION OF FAMILIES
A. Child Support Laws Affect Millions of Families
Along with welfare, child support is our legal system’s primary mecha-
nism to provide for children who do not reside with two parents.  The child
support system affects millions of families, including numerous complex
families.  In 2007, just under sixteen million cases and over seventeen mil-
lion children were in the child support enforcement program.9
The structure of the American family has changed since the first federal
child support laws were passed in 1974.10  Many children are expected to
live apart from “at least one biological parent, usually the father, before they
reach the age of 18.”11  Numerous children are born to parents who are not
married, and the number of single-parent families has steadily increased.12
In the child support system, there are significant numbers of custodial par-
ents who have never been married.13  Having children with multiple partners
is also increasingly common, particularly in unmarried families.14  Families
in the child support system also reflect this increasing complexity; for exam-
ple, among Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”) cases in the
9 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT FY 2007 PRELIMINARY REPORT vi, viii (2008), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2008/preliminary_report_fy2007/Prelim2007.
pdf.
10 SUSAN D. STEWART, BRAVE NEW STEPFAMILIES: DIVERSE PATHS TOWARD
STEPFAMILY LIVING 10–11 (2007) (discussing social and demographic trends that have
changed the composition of stepfamilies, including that forty percent of unmarried
cohabitating couples live with children).
11 Anne C. Case, I-Fen Lin & Sara McLanahan, Explaining Trends in Child Support:
Economic, Demographic, and Policy Effects, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 171, 171 (2003).
12 One study suggests that almost forty percent of all births occur outside of marriage.
Lawrence M. Berger, Marcia J. Carlson, Sharon H. Bzostek & Cynthia Osborne, Parent-
ing Practices of Resident Fathers: The Role of Marital and Biological Ties, J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 625, 625 (2008).  Over one-third of all births and two-thirds of black births are to
unmarried mothers.  Brady E. Hamilton, Joyce A. Martin, Stephanie J. Ventura, Paul D.
Sutton & Fay Menacker, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Births: Preliminary
Data for 2004, 54 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 2 tbl.A (2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_08.pdf.
13 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUP-
PORT: 2005 3 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-234.pdf.
(indicating that one-third of custodial mothers in the sample population had never been
married).
14 See Kristin Harknett & Jean Knab, More Kin, Less Support: Multipartnered Fertil-
ity and Perceived Support Among Mothers, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 237, 237 (2007)
(noting that in approximately thirty-five percent of births in urban areas, either the mother
or father had a child with another partner); see also I-Fen Lin & Sara S. McLanahan,
Parental Beliefs about Nonresident Fathers’ Obligations and Rights, 69 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 382, 382 (2007) (about fifty percent of children are expected to “experience father
absence”); Daniel R. Meyer, Marcia Cancian & Steven T. Cook, Multiple-Partner Fertil-
ity: Incidence and Implications for Child Support Policy, 79 SOC. SERV. REV. 577, 581
(2005) (noting that “multiple fathers were more common as the number of children born
to a mother increased”).
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child support system, one study found that half of mothers in a research
group had children with multiple partners.15  Stepparenting is also increas-
ingly common, with one study suggesting that one-third of Americans are
members of a stepfamily.16  Same-sex partners are also increasingly raising
children together: according to the 2000 Census, over ninety-five percent of
U.S. counties have at least one same-sex couple with children under the age
of eighteen.17  These statistics demonstrate the decreasing prevalence of the
two-parent heterosexual model and the rise in single-parent households,
blended families, adoptive families, families headed by gays and lesbians,
and extended families.18
The general failure of child support, nationwide, provides context for
the particular failures that affect complex families.  Child support awards
have historically been inadequate and inconsistent.19  For example, fewer
15 EMMA CASPAR, UNIV. OF WISCONSIN–MADISON, REVIEW OF CHILD SUPPORT POLICIES
FOR MULTIPLE FAMILY OBLIGATION: FIVE CASE STUDIES 1 (2006), available at http://
www.irp.wisc.edu/research/childsup/cspolicy/pdfs/Caspar-Task4A-2006.pdf (citing MA-
RIA CANCIAN & DANIEL R. MEYER, UNIV. OF WISCONSIN–MADISON, ALTERNATIVE AP-
PROACHES TO CHILD SUPPORT POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTIPLE-PARTNER FERTILITY
(2006)).  At least twelve percent of children in the child support enforcement system
receive TANF.  Angela Ingram-Jones, Child Support Population Demographics — Help-
ing Point the Way, Child Support Report, in 30 CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 7 (2008).
16 Margorie Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club — Examining the
Financial [In]Security of Women in Remarriages, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 309,
313 (1999) (studying the effect of remarriage on women’s financial situations); see also
Larry L. Bumpass, R. Kelly Raley & James A. Sweet, The Changing Character of
Stepfamilies: Implications of Cohabitation and Nonmarital Childbearing, 32 DEMOGRA-
PHY 425, 428 (1995) (suggesting that, considering cohabitation, about forty percent of all
women and thirty percent of all children are likely to spend some time in a stepfamily);
Lisa Doodson & David Morley, Understanding the Roles of Non-Residential Stepmoth-
ers, 45 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 109, 110 (2006) (suggesting thirty percent of the
population and twenty to twenty-five percent of children live in stepfamilies).
17 Urban Institute, Gay and Lesbian Families in the Census: Couples with Children
(2003), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900626_Checkpoints_Couples.pdf.
18 JUDITH STACEY, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES: STORIES OF DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL IN LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 262–268 (Basic Books 1990) (showing examples of
blended families).  Disagreement concerning what to do about the changes in the family
is common. See, e.g., JYL J. JOSEPHSON, GENDER, FAMILIES, AND STATE: CHILD SUPPORT
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (1997) (indicating that ideology plays a role in these
disagreements); Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 4 (arguing that the policy question that accompanies the shifting
demographics and changing family should be “how we can support all individuals who
create intimate, caring relationships, regardless of the form of those relationships”);
Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving and Owing, 95
W. VA. L. REV. 275, 297 (1992–1993) (explaining that we have “choices about who
should be treated as families”).  Demographers examine family structure to see the extent
to which it affects children. See, e.g., Marcia Carlson & Sara McLanahan, Strengthening
Unmarried Families: Could Enhancing Couple Relationships Also Improve Parenting?
80 SOC. SERV. R. 297, 298 (2006); Berger, Carlson, Bzostek & Osborne, supra note 12, at R
626; Margaret F. Brinig & Stephen L. Nock, Legal Status and Effects on Children 27
(Notre Dame Univ., Working Paper No. 07-21, 2007).
19 See Margaret Campbell Haynes, A Review of Child Support Guidelines: Interpre-
tation and Application, 31 FAM. L.Q. 133, 135–36 (1997) (book review) (noting that most
noncustodial parents paid more in monthly car payments than in child support in 1978).
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than fifty percent of nonresident fathers paid any formal support in any
given year.20  In 2005, of the nearly eight million custodial parents with child
support awards, almost fifty-three percent of the parents were due outstand-
ing support awards, though most had received some support in the past
year.21
Although there is no national data on whether or how child support
compliance differs for complex families, some studies suggest a higher rate
of nonpayment.  According to one study, “[n]onresident fathers with simple
parenting obligations have 85% higher odds of paying child support than
nonresident fathers with complex parenting obligations.”22  Another study
suggests that “the median percent of current support paid in the last year by
obligors with multiple support orders was 36%, while it was 62% among
obligors with one current support order.”23  Although the causes and expla-
nations for the trends may be difficult to measure, these studies nonetheless
suggest that family complexity is correlated with lower rates of child support
payment.24
B. Child Support Laws Embody a Narrow Definition of “Family” that
Fails to Reflect the Reality of Families
Contemporary child support laws embody a narrow duty of support, a
narrow definition of parenthood, and a misplaced focus on the dissolving
nuclear family.  All parents have a duty to support their minor children,
which lasts until the child reaches the age of majority, dies, is emancipated,
or the state terminates the parent-child relationship.25  The duty to support
children “stems from the parents’ literal responsibility for bringing the chil-
dren into existence.”26  Although child support is viewed as the right of the
20 STEWART, supra note 10, at 114–15 (citing a survey that less than half of custodial R
mothers received child support and only sixty percent had a legal agreement regarding
child support); see also THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 40 (Wil-
liam S. Comanor ed., 2004) (suggesting the “collective goods” aspect of children helps
to explain the existence of deadbeat dads who have incentives to shift the costs of chil-
dren onto the mother).
21 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13, at 7. R
22 Wendy D. Manning, Susan D. Stewart & Pamela J. Smock, The Complexity of
Fathers’ Parenting Responsibilities and Involvement with Nonresident Children, 24 J.
FAM. ISSUES 645, 659 (2003) (complexity of famlies results in less economic support).
23 ELAINE SORENSON, LILIANA SOUSA & SIMON SCHANER, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., Assessing Child Support Arrears in Nine Large States and the Nation
66–67 (2007), available at http:/aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/assessing-CS-debt/report.pdf.
24 See Manning, Stewart & Smock, supra note 22, at 664 (noting the difficulty of R
accounting for all the factors influencing nonpayment but suggesting some solutions).
25 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.03(2) (discussing the factors a court should con- R
sider in imposing an obligation).
26 Minow, supra note 7, at 308.  As Minow notes, this rationale does not give any R
insight into the scope of the obligation, either in how much support or under what cir-
cumstances it should be adjusted. Id. at 320; see also Ira Mark Ellman, Thinking about
Custody and Support in Ambiguous-Father Families, 36 FAM. L.Q. 49, 71 (2002) (ex-
plaining current child support laws in terms of normative assumptions about the duties
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child, it is usually paid to a parent.27  Only in extremely limited circum-
stances will the support obligation extend to non-parents.  Grandparents do
not ordinarily have a child support obligation for their grandchildren but
may be ordered to pay support if acting in loco parentis.28  Child support
obligations for same-sex parents vary depending on the state and may be
afforded under several theories.29  Stepparents and their stepchildren are or-
dinarily “legal strangers to each other,” but some states include stepparents
in their support statute.30
In addition to this narrow duty of support, parenthood is also narrowly
defined as an “exclusive status” in which a child can have only one set of
parents.31  Several doctrines have been used to expand parenting beyond bio-
that arise from biological parenthood); cf. Scott Altman, A Theory of Child Support, 17
INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 173, 179–80 (2003) (critiquing a theory of consent as a justifica-
tion for child support payments).
27 For an argument in favor of allowing adult children to seek retroactive child sup-
port, see Lani P. Shaw, Show Me the Money!: Analyzing an Adult Child’s Standing to
Recover Retroactive Child Support Payments, 48 HOW. L.J. 1053, 1055 (2005).
28 Laura W. Morgan, Child Support Obligations of Grandchildren (1999), http://
www.childsupportguidelines.com/articles/art199910.html (discussing relevant statutes
and case law).  For a definition of in loco parentis, see infra note 34. R
29 See, e.g., Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners: Strangers, Third Parties, or
Parents? The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle for Parental Equality, 40 FAM.
L.Q. 23, 42–49 (2006) (discussing cases from multiple states and various theories by
which same-sex coparents can achieve full recognition); Maggie Manternach, Where is
My Other Mommy?: Applying the Presumed Father Provision of the Uniform Parentage
Act to Recognize the Rights of Lesbian Mothers and Their Children, 9 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 385, 387 (2005) (discussing the possibility of using the Uniform Parentage Act to
obtain legal recognition). See generally Caroline P. Blair, It’s More Than a One-Night
Stand: Why a Promise to Parent Should Obligate a Former Lesbian Partner to Pay Child
Support in the Absence of a Statutory Requirement, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 465, 467
(2006); Sara R. David, Turning Parental Rights Into Parental Obligations — Holding
Same-Sex, Non-Biological Parents Responsible for Child Support, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV.
921, 934–35 (2005); Nancy Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: The Last Thirty Years,
66 MONT. L. REV. 51, 57–58 (2005) (surveying developments).
30 MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 1, 4, 10. (1994); see ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.03 cmt. B, illus. 2; see also Margaret M. Mahoney, Support R
and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 40
(1984) (arguing for more comprehensive laws that establish “certainty and protection”
for stepfamily members); Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out,
62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 283–84 (using the stepparent relationship as an example of the
tensions inherent in government regulation of relationships); Laura W. Morgan, Positive
Parenting and Negative Contributions: Why Payment of Child Support Should Not be
Regarded as Dissipation of Marital Assets, 30 N.M. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (2000) (outlining
how child support law favors the timely payment of child support to children from prior
relationships when considering support payments to be made to a child born of a
marriage).
31 See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 886–93 (tracing the concept of parenthood as an R
exclusive status to the traditions of natural law and instrumentalism).  However, steppar-
ent income may be considered in some contexts even where the stepparent has no legal
support obligation. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Free Application for Federal Student
Aid (2008), http://www.fafsa.ed.gov/ (taking into account stepparent income when calcu-
lating eligibility for and amount of federal student aid).
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logical ties for purposes of child support, including de facto parenting,32 eq-
uitable estoppel,33 in loco parentis,34 and through contract.35  Even these
doctrines, however, limit the number of parents that a child may have.36
Many of these doctrines rely on outdated views on the prevalence of the
nuclear family.37  Current family laws do not contemplate the reality of over-
lapping families.38  Current child support laws presuppose a heterosexual,
typically married (but always cohabitating) family that permanently dis-
32 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 2.03(1)(c) (defining a de facto parent in terms R
of the amount of caretaking functions performed).
33 See id.  Estoppel may prohibit non-biological parents from disclaiming their re-
sponsibilities where they have been involved in a child’s life. Id.
34 The legal doctrine in loco parentis, Latin for “in place of parents,” may apply
where “an adult informally assumes custodial responsibility for a child.”  MAHONEY,
supra note 30, at 7.  Because the rights and obligations are created voluntarily, they are R
terminable at will. See id. at 18, 21.
35 Contracts arise most frequently in the surrogacy context. Id. at 27–28; see also
Howard Fink & June Carbone, Between Private Ordering and Public Fiat: A New Para-
digm for Family Law Decision-making, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 53–64 (2003) (discussing
the use of pre-conception declarations, particularly where assisted reproductive technol-
ogy is used); Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage
Orders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 643–59 (2005) (surveying various
state approaches to surrogacy contracts).  A full discussion of surrogacy and contracting
for parenting rights is outside the scope of this article.
36 See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child
Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1013
(2003) (criticizing current doctrine because, from the standpoint of the children, parental
relationships should “be based on truth and certainty rather than convenience or pre-
sumptions — or even biology”). But see Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the
Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 686 (2001) (arguing that “biolog-
ically-based legal construction of parenthood is actually a progressive tool for protecting
the integrity of those families who do not easily fit the dominant norms of family”).
Although there should probably be some limit to the number of parents a child may have,
further discussion of that point is outside the scope of this article.
37 See June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295,
1341–43 (2005) (arguing that parental rights need to be “unbundled”); Karen Syma
Czapanskiy, To Protect and Defend: Assigning Parental Rights When Parents and Living
in Poverty, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 943, 943 (exploring the interdependence of
interests between the child and birth mother and suggesting that the mother should have
the ability to designate another partner); Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assump-
tions about Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 643 (1993) (describing how reproductive
technologies are challenging assumptions about exclusivity); Matthew M. Kavanaugh,
Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 83, 94 (2004) (arguing that exclusive parental agreements ignore that fami-
lies often have more than one non-biological caregiver); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child
Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Les-
bian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 469 (1990) (sug-
gesting self-designation).
38 Allison Harrison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of
the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 506 (1998); see also Melanie B.
Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
809, 821, 852–56 (2006) (indicating that family law is moving in a paradoxical direction
because “courts and legislatures are embracing alternatives to biological parenthood”
even as biology alone frequently establishes parentage).
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solves.39  Expanding the definition of parenthood even further would better
serve the interests of children and parents in all family arrangements.40
This Article has also been informed by my experience supervising stu-
dent attorneys at the Washington College of Law who represent women in
child support matters.  Our clients’ lives rarely embody the dominant para-
digm, and the goals of child support are rarely accomplished as applied to
real people.  Many of our clients would benefit from an approach that ex-
pressly considered the needs of multiple families and incorporated an ex-
panded definition of the duty of support.  The dissonance between the legal
structure and the lives of those seeking to use it undermines the idealized
vision of child support implicit in the current laws.
Because the creation of new families may lead to a reassessment of
child support responsibility, we should examine the implementation of child
support guidelines in complex families.  Is there a cost to having subsequent
families?  Who bears it?  What choices do states make when low-income
parents do not have enough income to provide for all of their children?
Where there are limited resources, who should bear the cost of a parent’s
decision to have more children?41  Because these normative questions impli-
cate regulatory issues, it is important to understand how federal law influ-
ences the state agencies that implement child support laws.
II. CHILD SUPPORT IS HIGHLY REGULATED BY FEDERAL LAW, AND CHILD
SUPPORT LAWS PERPETUATE RACE AND GENDER STEREOTYPES
Child support is regulated largely by federal law.42  Federal laws govern
the implementation of child support policy at the state level.43  Despite the
39 See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 36, at 1013 (criticizing current doctrine as based R
on presumptions about biological parentage); JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 133 (explain- R
ing that changes in welfare policy have tended to reinforce traditional assumptions about
families).
40 See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 944–48 (discussing alternatives to an exclusive defini- R
tion of parenthood to better serve the child’s interests); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That
Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like
Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 361 (1994) (arguing that children have an independent
liberty interest in familial relationships and the definitions of family are too “adult-
centered”).
41 See MORGAN, supra note 6, § 3.04(a). R
42 For a description of federal legislation and regulations, see MORGAN, supra note 6, R
ch. 1, and Laura W. Morgan, Child Support Enforcement in the United States and the
Role of the Private Bar (2000), http://www.childsupportguidelines.com/articles/art
200009.html; see also Michelle Jo Beld & Len Biernat, Federal Intent for the State Child
Support Guidelines: Income Shares, Cost Shares, and the Realities of Shared Parenting,
37 FAM. L.Q. 165, 166 (2003) (arguing that what is most important in child support is
what is not regulated by federal law, as seen in the variety of state guidelines and factors
considered); Linda D. Elrod, Child Support Reassessed: Federalization of Enforcement
Nears Completion, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 697 (explaining the “federalization” of
child support).
43 States regulate child support through child support guideline statutes. See infra
notes 48–49 and accompanying text. R
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considerable guidance that federal laws and regulations provide to the states,
nowhere do federal laws or regulations address the particular concerns of
multiple families.44
The first major federal intervention in child support began in 1974 as a
component of welfare legislation, creating the “IV-D” system.45  The Family
Support Act, Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, requires states that re-
ceive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) funds to enforce
child support obligations.46  The current IV-D statute governing federal child
support specifies that the purpose of the federal child support law is the
following:
enforcing the support obligations owed by noncustodial parents to
their children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom such
children are living, locating noncustodial parents, establishing pa-
ternity, obtaining child and spousal support, and assuring that as-
sistance in obtaining support will be available under this part to all
children (whether or not eligible for assistance under a State pro-
gram funded under part A of this subchapter).47
Following the passage of the Family Support Act of 1974, the Child
Support Enforcement Act of 1984 mandated that each state develop guide-
lines to serve, at minimum, an advisory role in support calculations.48  This
Act was followed by the Family Support Act of 1988, which required all
states to enact guidelines and required that the amount derived from guide-
line calculations be presumptive, rather than advisory.49  Subsequent federal
child support laws included the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992
44 See 45 C.F.R. § 302 (2008) (describing state plan requirements).  Federal regula-
tions require that states have guidelines with a rebuttable presumption that they apply and
take into consideration the earnings and incomes of the noncustodial parent. See id.
§ 302.56.  Departures from the state guidelines must be justified by written findings and
should include a consideration of the best interest of the child. See id. § 302.56(g).
45 See Family Support Act, Title IV-D of the Social Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-647, 88 Stat. 2351 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–660).  The term “IV-D” is
the name for the child support enforcement programs administered by the government,
and comes from Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.  A child support case is typically
considered “IV-D” if the family has received welfare assistance.
46 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 (2008).
47 Id.
48 Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 18(a), 98
Stat. 1305, 1321 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667 (2000)) (requiring guidelines).
This Act amended Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, but it applies to non-IV-
D families as well.  The primary purpose is to ensure payment through increased enforce-
ment procedures, such as by requiring wage-withholding and including tax refund in-
tercepts. Id.
49 The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103, 102 Stat. 2343, 2346
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667 (2000)), requires the state guidelines to apply with a rebutta-
ble presumption and requires states to review their guidelines every four years.  Addition-
ally, the implementing federal regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (2007), require states to
use economic data on child-rearing costs.  See Beld & Biernat, supra note 42, at 173. R
Presumptive guidelines were thought to increase initial orders and the equity of orders.
Id. at 1–4, 6–7.  As a result of the 1988 law, all states have child support guidelines,
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(“CSRA”),50 the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, enacted
in 1994,51 and the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998.52
The Federal Child Support Enforcement Program is administered
through the Administration for Children and Families (“ACF”) of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services.53  Each state has a child support
enforcement agency, which can assist a parent in locating the other parent,
establishing paternity, and establishing, enforcing, modifying, and collecting
support.54  Although the enforcement of child support payments has two
tracks — private enforcement or state enforcement — state enforcement is
available to all parents, not only welfare recipients.55
The most significant change to child support laws came with the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(“PRWORA”).56  In addition to radically altering welfare, PRWORA revised
rules governing the distribution of child support collection among federal
and state governments and welfare families, required states to establish an
automated registry of all child support cases and a directory of new hires,
and required states to provide information to a federal parent locator ser-
vice.57  PRWORA also enhanced interstate enforcement and required states
typically tables, which set formulas or amounts to calculate child support payments.
MORGAN, supra note 6, § 1.02(d). R
50 Pub. L. No. 102-521, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 3403, 3403 (1992) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000)) (imposing a criminal penalty for failure to pay child support
arrears where the child lives in another state).
51 Pub. L. No. 103-383, 108 Stat. 4063 (1994) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738(B) (2000)) (establishing national standards for state courts to determine whether
they have jurisdiction to issue child support orders and how to treat child support orders
issued by courts in other states; penalizing states that fail to meet the federal child support
data processing requirements).
52 Pub. L. No. 105-200, § 401, 112 Stat. 645 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.) (giving financial incentives to states for child support col-
lection and performance).
53 45 C.F.R. §§ 301–307 (2008) (implementing provisions of Title IV-D of the Social
Security Act).
54 See id.
55 Private enforcement refers to parents who hire a private attorney to represent the
parent in a child support matter. See Barabara Glasner Fines, From Representing “Cli-
ents” to Serving “Recipients”: Transforming the Role of IV-D Child Support Enforcement
Attorney, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2155, 2156–57 (1999) (noting private enforcement is less
common than relying on state enforcement); see also Laura W. Morgan, Private Attorney
Access to Child Support Enforcement Tools in the Recommendations of the U.S. Commis-
sion on Interstate Child Support (2002), http://www.supportguidelines.com/articles/
art200203.html (suggesting that private enforcement may be less effective because pri-
vate attorneys do not have access to the same information and enforcement tools as
state agencies).  The possibility of state enforcement is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 657(a)(2)(B)(i)(II)(aa) (Supp II 1996).  Any parent, not just those on welfare, may re-
quest state enforcement, making this a unique program in which parents with income may
choose to “opt into the system.”  Fines, supra, at 2165 (citations omitted).
56 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).  This Act is explicit in its goals of promoting marriage, “responsi-
ble fatherhood and motherhood,” and preventing “out-of-wedlock” pregnancies. Id.
§ 101.
57 Id. §§ 315–316.
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to adopt the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”).58  It requires
all welfare recipients to cooperate with state enforcement of child support
orders and to assign their child support rights to the state.59
Child support and welfare have been explicitly linked because federal
involvement in child support began as part of the AFDC program.60  Child
support and welfare are also related because parents who receive child sup-
port may not need to depend on the government for welfare.  Perhaps not
surprisingly then, the problem of welfare dependency has influenced policy
decisions in the child support arena.61  Similarly, because federal child sup-
port involvement began as a part of AFDC, child support laws reflect the
same gender, race, and class biases that have historically plagued welfare.62
Specifically, single mothers are demonized in child support policies because
they are blamed for their dependency, either on child support or on welfare.63
Mothers on welfare who have children with multiple partners are especially
stigmatized.64  As welfare laws and policies have demonized poor parents,
58 The UIFSA essentially binds litigants to the child support determination made by
the original forum.  UIFSA §§ 101–905, 9 U.L.A. 171 (2001). For example, under
§ 604(a), “the law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration of
current payments and other obligations of support and the payment of arrearages under
the order.”
59 PRWORA § 333.  The assignment provision is 45 C.F.R. § 302.50 (2008) (requir-
ing states to implement assignment of rights to support), which existed prior to
PRWORA.  For an overview of the assignment process, see Vicki Turetsky, What if All
the Money Came Home?  Welfare Cost Recovery in the Child Support Program, 43 FAM.
CT. REV. 402, 405–07 (2005).
60 See Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229,
232–36 (2000) (noting that welfare law reform has allowed the government to regulate
familial relationships and that “family law” and “welfare law” serve overlapping func-
tions); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 893 (2004)
(using PRWORA to illustrate the relationship between welfare and family law).
61 Brito, supra note 60, at 250–52 (suggesting that family law subjects poor single R
mothers to differential treatment and that recent reforms in child support demonstrate the
“welfarization” of family law); see also Stacy L. Brustin, The Intersection Between Wel-
fare Reform and Child Support Enforcement: D.C.’s Weak Link, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 621,
627–31 (2003) (discussing enactment of welfare reform and its implications for child
support).
62 See JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 133 (explaining that changes in welfare policy R
have tended to reinforce gender, race, and class divisions); Naomi R. Cahn, Representing
Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 965, 970 (1997) (stat-
ing that welfare has a race and gender component in its public perception, historical basis,
and current demographics of recipients).
63 Martha Albertson Fineman, Preface to MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD, at ix (Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995)
(decribing how society stigmatizes single parents as bad parents with incomplete and
dysfunctional families, which results in bad consequences for their children).
64 See Rose Ernst, Localizing the “Welfare Queen” Ten Years Later: Race, Gender,
Place, and Welfare Rights, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 181, 185 (2008) (characterizing
“laziness” and “hyperfertility” as the core traits of the “welfare queen” stereotype, with-
out specific reference to multiple fathers); Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization
and Power: Reconfiguring Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74
BROOKLYN L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2008) (manuscript at 44), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287743 (citing scholarship discussing the
history of welfare policy’s contribution to gender and race subordination).
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child support laws carry on welfare law’s demonizing traditions in regulating
families.  The negative stereotypes of women on welfare, particularly wo-
men of color, carry over to single mothers seeking child support.65
For all parents in the child support system, hidden assumptions about
family are embedded in the gender-neutral child support laws: child support
policy contains assumptions about motherhood66 and fatherhood,67 which
often differ based on race.68  One attitude implicit in current child support
policy is that single motherhood is a problem that needs to be “fixed” by
marriage.69  Fathers are frequently portrayed as deadbeats whose only value
as a parent is economic.70  Child support enforcement policies punish women
65 See Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of
Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415, 433 (1999) (discussing welfare’s
shift toward compulsory labor force participation and that the legal images of women on
welfare have changed over time, with a focus away from valuing mothering); see also Jyl
Josephson, The Intersectionality of Domestic Violence and Welfare in the Lives of Poor
Women, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS, GENDER,
AND CULTURE 83, 88 (Natalie Sokoloff ed., 2005) (indicating that welfare policy distin-
guishes between deserving and undeserving poor and controls recipients by requiring
specific behaviors).  The welfare state is also being used to discipline poor men. JOSEPH-
SON, supra note 18, at 138. R
66 Fineman, supra note 63, at xi. R
67 Because fatherhood is biologically harder to determine than motherhood, the study
of fatherhood and the ideology surrounding it has generated much scholarship. See gen-
erally Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legiti-
macy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 233–34 (2006); Nancy E.
Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining Fatherhood, 10 CAR-
DOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 132, 135–37 (2003); Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria
for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461, 472–73; Solangel Maldonado, Beyond
Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
921, 941 (2005); Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution:
Biology ‘Plus’ Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47, 48 (2004).
68 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, in
MOTHERS IN LAW, supra note 63, at 225–27 (exploring “how racism and patriarchy inter- R
act in the social construction of motherhood”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 210 (1995) (demonstrating that the role of the genetic tie is indeter-
minate and designed to promote racist and patriarchal norms); see also June Carbone,
Morality, Public Policy and the Family: The Role of Marriage and the Public/Private
Divide, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267, 349 (1996) (describing how slavery profoundly
shaped marriage and, consequently, child support); Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single
Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 36–37, 47 (1995) (stating that “the intersection of
race and gender generates powerful stereotypes about black women” as single mothers);
Twila L. Perry, Race Matters: Change, Choice, and Family Law at the Millennium, 33
FAM. L.Q. 461, 472 (1999) (noting that society discourages the birth of children to black
families while simultaneously providing the opportunity for more white families to have
children through adoption and reproductive technologies).
69 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage
Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1647, 1672 (2005) (describ-
ing the shift in the image of the welfare mother from “a deserving white widow to a
black single mother”).
70 Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor
Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 994, 1012 (2006) (explaining that the law has con-
structed the concept of fatherhood as merely the payment of child support and thus too
narrowly).
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by “simultaneously offer[ing] women access to resources while reinscribing
traditional gender roles.”71  Martha Minow has suggested that contemporary
debates about child support and welfare reform are targeted attacks on wo-
men who fail to conform to expected roles.72
Child support laws implicitly assume a particular vision of the family:
mothers are the custodial parents and fathers are the child support obligors.
Although child support laws have become gender-neutral over time,73 they
still enforce gender roles by calling for the return of fathers74 and, through
welfare assignment, regulate the behavior of mothers.75  At the same time,
the reality of child support is highly gendered: most recipients of child sup-
port are mothers while most obligors are fathers.76  According to a recent
demographic survey sponsored by the Office of Child Support Enforcement
(“OCSE”), close to ninety-five percent of custodial parents in the child sup-
port system are mothers.77  Moreover, the current failures of child support
may not receive the attention they deserve because the responsibility for
child care is typically seen as the duty of mothers.78
While perpetuating stereotypes based on race and gender, none of these
federal child support laws — from 1974 until the present — explicitly ad-
71 JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 128; see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Child Sup- R
port is Not the Answer: The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare Reform, in CHILD SUP-
PORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER 209, 210–11 (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli eds.,
2000) (indicating that government preferences like tax breaks serve as a form of welfare
assistance for everyone, but that only traditional nuclear families receive “unstigmatized
assistance”).
72 See Minow, supra note 30, at 281 (noting that child support enforcement can be R
used to benefit the state while punishing individuals).
73 For example, the 1988 Senate Report states that “the problem of nonsupport of
children by their parents has become a serious one for this country.  Nearly one-quarter of
all children now live with only one parent.  And although many noncustodial parents are
diligent payers of child support, there are millions who are not.” S. REP. NO. 100-377, at
8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2776, 2785.  The 1988 Report briefly mentions
“mothers” and “fathers,” noting that “fewer than one in five mothers who had never
been married had been awarded support.” Id.
74 For example, the 1974 Senate Report states that “[t]he problem of welfare in the
United States is, to a considerable extent, a problem of the non-support of children by
their absent parent.” S. REP. NO. 93-1356, at 42 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
8133, 8145.
75 See ANN MARIE SMITH, WELFARE REFORM AND SEXUAL REGULATION 3 (2007) (stat-
ing that “the poor single mother who receives TANF benefits must name the biological
father of her children and assist the state in collecting support payments from him”).
76 See, e.g., D.C. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINE COMMISSION pt. II, ch. 4, at 4–5 (2004), available at
http://csed.dc.gov/csed/cwp/view,a,3,q,588962,pm,1,csedNav,%7C31158%7C.asp (find-
ing that the petitioner for support was the mother in ninety-six percent of cases).
77 ELAINE SORENSON & TESS TANNEHILL, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DEMO-
GRAPHIC SURVEY RESULTS FROM NINE STATE IV-D PROGRAMS (2007) (on file with
Harvard Law School Library).
78 Mothers are often presumed to be the primary caretakers of young children, as
evidenced by the long-held “tender years presumption” in family law doctrine (the judi-
cial presumption that mothers are more connected to young children). See Julie E. Arties,
Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the Tender Years Doctrine, 38
L. & SOC’Y REV. 769, 770 (2004).
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dress family complexity.79  Throughout the existence of federal child support
laws, enforcement programs, and welfare laws, the federal government has
remained silent on the issue of multiple families.  The new theory of limited
equalization seeks to remedy this problem in federal and state child support
regimes.
III. FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT GOALS IGNORE MULTIPLE FAMILIES: A FOCUS
ON CHILD SUPPORT LAWS AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES,
STRATEGIC PLANS, AND FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF
STATE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
Federal child support goals are important because they drive the imple-
mentation of child support laws.  Federal child support laws are based on
three explicit goals, none of which address the needs of complex families or
give guidance on how to allocate limited resources for low-income multiple
families.80  The three stated goals of federal involvement in child support are
(1) fiscal savings, (2) children’s economic well-being, and (3) public en-
forcement of parental responsibility.81  These goals, particularly the focus on
fiscal savings, are well-documented: they are stated in the child support laws
and corresponding legislative histories,82 in the strategic plans of the federal
child support agency,83 and in federal oversight of state child support
guidelines.84
A. Federal Child Support Goals Stated in Federal Laws and Legislative
Histories Ignore Multiple Families
The goals of fiscal savings and economic well-being were discussed in
the 1974 Family Support Act.85  The legislative history of the 1974 Act ex-
79 The one exception is that PRWORA addresses multiple families in the context of
reducing benefits and defining who counts for the purpose of benefits. See Pub. L. No.
104-193, sec. 103(a)(1), § 402(a)(7)(A)(iii), 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (1996) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (2000)).  Although TANF does not require a “family cap”
(denying additional financial assistance to mothers who have children while receiving
welfare), it permits states to deny additional assistance. See National Conference of State
Legislators, Family Cap Policies, http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/welfare/familycap05.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
80 These three goals, in conjunction with all of the child support laws, make up what I
call “child support policy.”
81 JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 43–45 (describing documentation of the three goals R
and noting that “[t]he clearest norm . . . is the emphasis on the financial responsibility of
legal parents”).
82 See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text (discussing child support laws, the R
most notable of which were passed in 1974, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1994); see also ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.04 cmt. b (describing the “societal interests in protecting R
the public purse and ensuring adequate investment in children”).
83 See infra Part III.B.
84 See infra Part III.C.
85 Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, pt. A, sec. 2, § 2001(1),
88 Stat. 2337 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (2000)).
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pressly tied these two goals to increased parental responsibility by blaming
the problem of non-support on absent fathers.86  Although the child support
laws were expanded in 1984 to cover families not receiving welfare,87 legis-
lators continued to characterize the problem as one of absent parents and
single-parent homes.88  Additionally, increased paternity establishment has
been an element of child support laws since their inception.89  The overarch-
ing goals of fiscal savings, children’s economic well-being, and parental re-
sponsibility continued to influence federal child support legislation in the
1980s.90
The PRWORA promoted fiscal savings, economic well-being, and pa-
rental responsibility.91  However, while the PRWORA characterizes the dem-
ographic shifts as a “crisis,” it virtually ignores multiple families.92  For
example, Congress observed that individuals receiving assistance had tripled
since 1965 and “[e]ighty-nine percent of the children receiving AFDC ben-
efits now live in homes in which no father is present.”93  The findings also
state that “[t]he increase in the number of children receiving public assis-
tance is closely related to the increase in births to unmarried women,”94 and
claim that the “negative consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth on the
mother, the child, the family, and society” are well-documented.95  Although
the findings refer to single-parent homes, there is no mention of multiple
families.   Although the PRWORA requires welfare recipients to cooperate
86 See supra note 74. R
87 Child Support Enforcement Amendment Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, sec. 2,
98 Stat. 1305, 1305–06.
88 For example, the Child Support Enforcement Amendment Act of 1984 included
findings about the “alarming” divorce rate and increasing number of children raised in
single parent families. Id. sec. 23; see also S. REP. NO. 98-387, at 22–30 (1984), re-
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397, 2418–26 (1984) (clarifying the expanded role of the
federal government and the procedures states can use to enhance enforcement).
89 S. REP. NO. 93-1356, at 51 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8146
(noting the Committee’s concern “that all children have the right to receive support from
their fathers . . . including the right to have their fathers identified so that support can be
obtained”).  The emphasis on paternity establishment is also designed to enhance the
financial and emotional well-being of children by providing children a link to their absent
fathers. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 36. R
90 The stated purpose of the Family Support Act of 1988 was to “revise the AFDC
program to emphasize work, child support, and family benefits . . . and to encourage and
assist needy children and parents under the new program to obtain the education, training,
and employment to avoid long-term welfare dependence.”  Family Support Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-485, pmbl. 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).  The 1988 Senate Report states that
the purpose is to stress “family responsibility” in the “context of the vastly changed
family arrangements of the intervening half century.” S. REP. NO. 100-377, at 14–15
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2776, 2791–92.  The Report emphasized “child
support enforcement and job training as the primary means of avoiding long-term welfare
dependence.” Id. at 15.
91 PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
92 Id. § 101(10).  Rather than changing policies to include multiple families, the
PRWORA proposed changes to prevent out-of-wedlock birth and pregnancy. Id.
93 Id. § 101(5).
94 Id. § 101(5)(C).
95 Id. § 101(8).
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with “establishing paternity . . . or in . . . establishing, modifying, or enforc-
ing a support order,” the statute does not explain or give guidance on how to
establish, modify, or enforce support orders where there are multiple fami-
lies.96  The legislative history of the PRWORA confirms that one goal was to
reduce the number of women receiving welfare by replacing welfare with
privately paid child support.97  Nevertheless, the legislative history is silent
on the challenges multiple families present to accomplishing the goal of fis-
cal savings.
The current IV-D statute continues to prioritize the role of state en-
forcement in order to limit fiscal spending on child support.  The current
statute and regulations provide extensive state plan requirements,98 including
requiring assignment of rights to support for welfare recipients99 and regulat-
ing state child support guidelines.100  None of the current stated goals specifi-
cally addresses family complexity.
B. Federal Child Support Goals Stated in the Federal Strategic Plans
Ignore Multiple Families
Public documents created by the OCSE state that the primary goal of
federal child support policy is fiscal savings.101  The strategic plans largely
ignore the role of multiple families, even with regard to the goal of fiscal
savings.  According to the OCSE, the mission of the Child Support Enforce-
ment Program is to “enhance the well-being of children by assuring that
assistance in obtaining support, including financial and medical, is available
to children through locating parents, establishing paternity, establishing sup-
port obligations, and monitoring and enforcing those obligations.”102  Al-
though the most recent National Child Support Enforcement Strategic Plan
(“Strategic Plan”) prepared by the OCSE states that child support is “no
96 Id. § 333.
97 House reports for the PRWORA openly express the link between welfare reform,
child support, and state fiscal savings, as demonstrated in the following report which
contains the following explanation for getting “tough” on child support enforcement:
The committee believes it is irresponsible for Federal benefits to be available to
parents (and, at State option, families) that do not cooperate in attempting to ob-
tain proper child support.  In thousands of cases, if child support were collected as
ordered, families would not have to depend on taxpayer-funded welfare benefits.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-651, at 1347 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2406
(1996).  Additional legislative history to the PRWORA, which includes extensive hearing
testimony, confirms the centrality of child support to welfare reform.
98 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 666–67 (1996); 45 C.F.R. § 302 (2008).
99 45 C.F.R. § 302.50 (2008).
100 45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (2008).
101 JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 36 (referencing public documents). R
102 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIC PLAN, FISCAL YEAR 2005–2009 PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT 6 (2004), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2004/Strategic_
Plan_FY2005-2009.pdf.
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longer primarily a welfare reimbursement device,”103 other goals in the Stra-
tegic Plan continue to include welfare cost-recovery.104
The most recent Strategic Plan is largely silent on family complexity,
mentioning only the need to “update child support guidelines to recognize
modern family dynamics and realities (e.g. shared custody, incomes of cus-
todial parents, etc.)” without specifying goals or objectives on this point.105
Although one strategy in the Stratgic Plan is to emphasize prevention and
early intervention by “provid[ing] information and education to parents
about the impact of marriage and single parenting on the financial security
of children,” there is no reference to multiple families or family complexity
or any description of the information to be provided.106  In sum, federal child
support policy documents fail to address family complexity in a meaningful
way, leaving states to make important policy decisions without guidance.
C. Federal Advisory Panel on Child Support Guidelines Failed to
Provide Guidance Regarding Multiple Families in State
Child Support Guidelines
The three federal child support goals are implemented through federal
laws and state guidelines.107  Despite heavily regulating state guidelines, the
federal government does not provide guidance to states about complex fami-
lies.  There is considerable federal control over the guidelines: federal law
requires that guidelines apply presumptively and that written findings sup-
port awards that deviate from the state guidelines.108
The Federal Advisory Panel on Child Support Guidelines, which called
for the passage of the 1988 Act, established the underlying methodology of
child support guidelines, devoid of any goals for multiple families.109  The
goals of the guidelines included making orders more consistent with costs of
child-rearing,110 improving equity among orders, and improving efficiency
103 Id. at 1.
104 For example, improving the collection rate in welfare cases remains an explicit
goal in the Strategic Plan.  Id. at 8 (“Objective A: To increase the IV-D Collection
Rate”).
105 Id. at 2.
106 Id. at 10.
107 See discussion supra Part III.A.
108 MORGAN, supra note 6, § 1.02(c).  The Family Support Act of 1988 dealt explic- R
itly with state guidelines, and was codified as federal regulation 45 C.F.R. § 302.56
(2007).
109 ROBERT WILLIAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DEVELOPMENT OF
GUIDELINES FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS: ADVISORY PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL
REPORT (1987).
110 Id. pt. II, at ii–iii, 13–40.  In distinguishing between poor families and non-poor
families, the Panel wrote, “[a]lthough a subsistence level standard for supporting chil-
dren is a useful benchmark, child support guidelines must be applied to the preponderant
number of households with incomes above the subsistence level.” Id. pt. II, at 17.  This
comment shows a preoccupation with non-poor families and a disregard for the specific
concerns of low-income families.
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by encouraging settlements and reducing the hearing time to resolve con-
tested cases.111  In 1987, the Advisory Panel on Child Support Guidelines
recommended that states follow a number of principles in enacting guide-
lines, including that “[b]oth parents share legal responsibility for supporting
their children,” with the economic responsibility divided between the par-
ents in proportion to their income, that the child is entitled to share in the
benefit of the improved standard of one parent, and that the guidelines
should not create “extraneous negative effects on the major life decisions of
either parent.”112  However, the role of new relationships and remarriage in
child support policy is often subtle, as reflected in this passage from the ALI
Principles on Family Dissolution:
[A] parent’s interest in remarriage has not been taken into account
in formulating the objectives of this Chapter.  Historically, this in-
terest was invoked to justify low child support payments.  The no-
tion was that the payor, almost invariably the father, needed to
retain his earnings in order to remarry.  This view comes from a
time when men earned a family wage and married women were
not expected to participate in the labor force.  Today, remarriage
often increases the support payor’s household income.  More im-
portantly, each parent has an interest in remarriage, and each may
be understood to bring negative dower, in the form of preexisting
child-care and child-support obligations, to a new relationship.
Recognizing only the nonresidential parent’s interest in remarriage
by reducing the otherwise appropriate amount of his child-support
payment would unjustifiably increase the negative dower of the
residential parent. Thus, each parent’s interest in remarriage offsets
the other’s.113
Although the Advisory Panel on Child Support Guidelines principles recog-
nize that parents may have other dependents or remarry, they fail to explain
how to resolve the tension between existing and subsequent families.
As early as 1987, the Advisory Panel on Child Support Guidelines rec-
ognized the complexity of the issue of multiple families, but failed to ad-
dress the actual design of child support guidelines.114  The Panel
111 Id. pt. II, at 1–6; see also MORGAN, supra note 6, § 1.02(e) (characterizing the R
summary of the Final Report (Part II) as having these elements).
112 WILLIAMS, supra note 109, pt. I, at 4.  The Advisory Panel specifically stated (in R
endorsing the income-shares model) that the income of a new spouse would not affect the
obligation. Id. pt. I, at 17.
113 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.04 cmt. g. R
114 WILLIAMS, supra note 109, pt. I, at 23–24.  For example, the Advisory Panel rec- R
ommended additional research into “situations involving multiple support responsibili-
ties” in order to “yield equitable results for the children involved and their parents,” but
there is no substantive discussion on what would be “equitable.” Id.  As another exam-
ple, the Panel expressed concern about assumptions regarding the relationship between
“other natural children” and income of the current spouse. Id. pt II, at 51–55.
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recommended that guidelines address the “treatment of multiple child sup-
port responsibilities,” stating the following principles:
(1) When a parent has multiple child support responsibilities, each
child entitled to support . . . should share equally in that parent’s
resources, subject to the variations required by the needs of the
individual child and the amount of support due that child from the
child’s other parent; (2) . . . a support award should consider all
support responsibilities of a parent when support is set for any
child of the parent; and, (3) . . . funds a parent is required by law
. . . and actually pays [for an existing order] should be considered
unavailable for calculating support [in a new case].115
Despite this recommendation, the Panel did not suggest a method for allocat-
ing child support among families.116  Instead, the Panel noted that courts
have been divided on how to treat support obligations for subsequent depen-
dents of either parent and stated that the choice “should be made after a
review of constitutional law, case law, and current practice in the state.”117
Additionally, the Panel stated that “complex fact situations may at times
require departure from guidelines, particularly in cases of multiple child sup-
port responsibilities.”118  These recommendations fail to provide any con-
crete instructions or goals with regard to complex families.
The overall goal of child support guidelines remains to reduce the cost
of child support collection for the federal government, without attention to
multiple families.119  By ignoring the needs of multiple families, the goals of
federal child support laws are both misguided and unsuccessful.  Multiple
families, especially low-income families, should not be ignored by policy
makers.
115 Id. pt. I, at 19.
116 The Panel described three approaches to allocation: giving priority to first-born
children; according equal weight to the interests of all dependent children; and giving
priority to children in the current household of the obligor. Id. pt. II, at 53.  This report is
unique in its description of a “last in first out approach” that explicitly gives priority to
the children currently living with the obligor.  See id.
117 Id.  The Panel did suggest that the most “administratively viable” approach is to
subtract preexisting orders from the obligor’s income. Id. pt. II, at 54.
118 Id. pt. I, at 19.  This appears to be an implicit concession to fathers, at least based
on the standard assumed paradigm that fathers are more likely to exit from the first fam-
ily and then remarry.  Moreover, the Panel did not advise including stepparent income
because of “additional complexity that would be caused by inclusion of this factor.” Id.
pt. II, at 55.
119 MORGAN, supra note 6, § 1.02(e) (explaining that fiscal concerns provide the R
nexus that permits Congress to legislate in this area).  In addition to the goals established
in the federal child support laws, in the legislative history, and in OSCE reports, other
sources may offer insight into the purposes of federal and state involvement in child
support.  For example, the ALI Principles also fail to account for family complexity and
resource allocation among low-income multiple families. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 6, § 3.04 (outlining nine objectives, none of which address the specific needs of R
multiple families).
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IV. CRITIQUING FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN CHILD SUPPORT: HOW FISCAL
SAVINGS, CHILDREN’S ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, AND PARENTAL
INVOLVEMENT FAIL AS GOALS
Each of the three stated goals of federal child support laws — fiscal
savings, children’s economic well-being, and public enforcement of parental
responsibility — is worthy of critique.  Like most public policy, child sup-
port laws must accomodate multiple and conflicting interests and goals.120
For example, children’s economic well-being is in obvious conflict with lim-
iting governmental expense.121   This Article explores the ways in which
these goals, already problematic as applied to traditional families, are not
suited to address the needs of complex families, and should not drive child
support policy.
A. Fiscal Savings Is an Unattainable and Unworthy Goal
Fiscal savings is a proven failure for poor families and for multiple
families.  Fiscal savings should not be a component of child support policy
because it prefers the state’s financial interests over children’s well-being.
Multiple families compound the already significant challenges of fiscal sav-
ings in single-family households.
Child support collection has been criticized as a fiscal failure, particu-
larly because of the high administrative costs.122  According to the OCSE
2007 annual report, nearly $25 billion in child support payments were col-
lected and distributed.123  However, this figure includes voluntary payments
that require no significant effort to collect, such as income withholding,
which accounts for almost seventy percent of payments.124  The costs of ad-
ministration make fiscal savings particularly unlikely for multiple fami-
lies.125  Although there is no data on what percentage of the voluntary
120 See JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 43 (arguing that we should expect child support R
policies to have conflicting goals for a number of reasons, including their links to social
welfare policy, their support from both liberal and conservative politicians, and their con-
nection to families and family relationships); see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, R
§ 3.04 cmt. a (2002) (recognizing that many of its stated goals conflict); Minow, supra
note 7, at 319–20 (arguing that the basic purposes of child support conflict). R
121 JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 46. R
122 See Daniel Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best In-
terest of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029,
1070–74 (2007).
123 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 9, at A-1. R
124 JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at vii, C-8. R
125 See Hatcher, supra note 122, at 120 (noting that “in 2004, only ten states were R
still making a profit on the child support program and states in the aggregate lost over
$515 million”); Ronald K. Henry, Child Support Policy and the Unintended Conse-
quences of Good Intentions, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
128, 129 (William S. Comanor ed., 2004) (noting that, in the 2000 fiscal year, the federal
government spent $3 billion on child support enforcement and recovered less than $1
billion).
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payments are for children in complex families, it is unlikely, given the chal-
lenges of administering multiple income-withholding orders, that multiple
families receive a higher percentage of payments.126  Administrative ex-
penses offset a significant portion of the remaining collections expenses ex-
ceeding $5 billion; the federal administrative expenses in 2007 were $3.7
billion and state administrative expenses were $1.9 billion.127  Child support
recovery is unlikely to become cost effective because the enforcement agen-
cies continue to expand their responsibilities and employ over 60,000 full-
time employees.128  For complex families, administrative costs increase be-
cause the enforcement agencies must sort through multiple support orders
and enforcements across state lines.129  Additionally, the increased interstate
movement of families is a pressing, yet often overlooked, topic in child sup-
port, as demonstrated by the procedures developed under UIFSA and the
creation of interstate child support enforcement protocols.130
The fiscal failure is even more apparent, and exacerbated, for low-in-
come complex families.  For example, there are limited fiscal savings where
a child support order raises one family above the poverty line but does not
eliminate welfare dependency for another family.  It is unlikely that enforce-
ment related to welfare cost recovery is cost effective for complex fami-
lies.131  Of the $25 billion in child support payments recovered in 2007, less
than $2 billion were for welfare recovery.132  Significantly, at the poverty
level, the costs of the enforcement bureaucracy outweigh the amount of sup-
port collected, particularly where the enforcement agencies must handle
126 See infra note 129 and accompanying text; see also supra note 79 and accompa- R
nying text (stating that individual states are permitted to impose caps on total assistance
per family); supra note 119 and accompanying text (asserting that ALI principles fail to R
account for multiple families).
127 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 9, at A-1, C-13.  The federal R
government reimburses most of the state expenses.  For example, according to the FY
2006 report, “[t]he federal government reimburses the states for 66% of allowable ad-
ministrative expenses and 90% of laboratory paternity tests.” OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FY 2006 PRELIMINARY REPORT
(2007), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/preliminary_report.
128 See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., FY 2006 PRELIMINARY REPORT (2007), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/pro-
grams/cse/pubs/2007/preliminary_report; see also JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 48 (dis- R
cussing enforcement agencies’ expanding responsibilities).
129 This applies even to complex families with ample financial resources.  A seem-
ingly simple income-withholding order may be an administrative challenge and expense
where the agency responsible for the wage withholding has to redistribute the withhold-
ing to several families.
130 See UIFSA §§ 101–905.  Interstate cases involving multiple families pose an ad-
ditional drain on the resources of enforcement agencies.
131 Hatcher, supra note 122, at 1070–74 (suggesting that welfare cost recovery efforts R
are likely not cost effective); see Turetsky, supra note 59, at 402.  Because of these fail- R
ures, I do not support improving the enforcement mechanisms for multiple families.
132 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 9, at A-1.  This data does not R
differentiate between complex and non-complex welfare families.  However, if welfare
cost recovery fails even for non-complex families, it most likely fails for more complex
families.
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many open cases for one parent with multiple children.133  Moreover, fiscal
savings are impossible if the child support obligor does not have the funds to
repay the state.134  Similarly, there are no savings where the obligor cannot
pay arrears.135  For multiple families, the goal of fiscal savings is unlikely to
be met as long as there are outstanding child support obligations for any one
of the families.
Tough child enforcement policies aim at fiscal savings, but these meth-
ods have proven especially ineffective in assisting low-income families.136
Where multiple families are also low-income, the children receive little ben-
efit from rigorous child support enforcement.137  Moreover, state enforce-
ment of child support obligations does not benefit all women and their
children to the same degree.  State enforcement of child support benefits
formerly married women more than unmarried women because formerly
married women are likely to receive more child support.138  Child support
enforcement mechanisms are also more likely to help middle-class and up-
per-class parents than low-income parents because wage withholding, typi-
cally more available to middle- and upper-class parents, is a more effective
enforcement mechanism than the mechanisms available to low-income par-
ents.139  As an example, non-TANF families received eighty-four percent of
133 See Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of
Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1070 n.358 (1995); see also Ronald K. Henry,
Child Support at a Crossroads: When the Real World Intrudes Upon Academics and
Advocates, 33 FAM. L.Q. 235, 237 (1999) (stating that no matter what means are used,
collection from impoverished demographics is impossible).  Child support cases are typi-
cally not consolidated.
134 For example, a low-income parent who does not have the funds to pay child sup-
port directly to the other is unlikely to have the funds to repay the state the costs of
welfare payment.  Additionally, there is little incentive to pay the state given that the
parent sees no direct benefit to the child. See Hatcher, supra note 122, at 1074–82. R
135 The story of child support arrears is complicated.  In 2007, there were over $107
billion of arrears owed. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 9, at viii R
(finding that only $7 billion of that amount was collected).  Most of the arrears are owed
by a small number of noncustodial parents, each of whom owes a large amount of arrears.
See SORENSON, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 23, at 16 (finding, in a study of nine states, R
that eleven percent of the obligors owed over fifty percent of the arrears and each owed
over $30,000).
136 See Hatcher, supra note 122, at 1066–82. R
137 See, e.g., Elrod, supra note 42, at 708. R
138 One study explicitly found that states with effective child support enforcement
(measured by strict legislation and high expenditures) are more likely to help children
born into marital families. See Chien-Chung Huang, The Impact of Child Support En-
forcement on Nonmarital and Marital Births: Does it Differ by Racial and Age Groups?,
76 SOC. SERV. REV. 275, 275 (2002).  At the same time, “formal” child support awards
are less common among women who have not been married. See Case, Lin & McLana-
han, supra note 11, at 173; see also Leena Nepomnyaschy, Child Support and Father- R
Child Contact: Testing Reciprocal Pathways, 44 DEMOGRAPHY 93, 93 (2007)
(“[C]hildren born to never-married parents tend to experience even more disadvantages
because these families are more likely to be poor, more likely to receive public assis-
tance, and less likely to receive child support than children born to previously married
parents.”).
139 See ChildTrends DataBank, Child Support Receipt, http://www.childtrendsdata
bank.org/indicators/84childsupport.cfm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (noting that higher ed-
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child support collections in 2007.140  Given the prevalence of family com-
plexity in TANF families, it is likely that these families are particularly ill-
served by child support enforcement measures.141  Additionally, significant
research indicates that strong child support enforcement merely reduces the
amount of informal support, meaning that an increase in formal support con-
tributes little to the total amount of support received.142  Despite the govern-
ment expenditures on child support enforcement, poor families do not
receive significant financial benefits from tough enforcement.143  In addition
to failing to provide financial benefits to poor children, tough enforcement
also provides no fiscal benefit to the government.144  Accordingly, where
complex families contain unmarried or low-income parents, they are less
likely to be helped by child support enforcement.
State enforcement in the name of fiscal savings is also widely criticized
as punitive to poor women.  Because states require welfare recipients to as-
sign their child support rights to the state, recipients of AFDC have no
choice in whether or not to enforce the child support obligations of a non-
custodial parent.145  The punitive nature of child support enforcement ad-
versely influences the caseworker’s perception, suggesting that poor mothers
lie or withhold information and poor fathers fail to assume responsibility.146
ucational status and having been previously married both correlated to a higher rate of
receiving child support payments); see also MAUREEN R. WALLER, MY BABY’S FATHER:
UNMARRIED PARENTS AND PATERNAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 6 (Cornell Univ. Press 2002) (ex-
plaining that child support enforcement has not been effective for families headed by
unmarried mothers); Martha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policy, in
CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER 16, 31 (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli
eds., 2000) (indicating that for middle- and upper-class parents, wage withholding has
been effective in improving payment rates); Turetsky, supra note 59, at 404 (“Black and R
Hispanic children are less likely to have child support orders, or to receive child support,
and they tend to receive lower amounts.”).
140 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 9, at C-7. R
141 See TONYA BRITO, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
AND COMPLICATED FAMILIES: AN ANALYSIS OF CROSS-STATE VARIATION IN LEGAL TREAT-
MENT OF MULTIPLE PARTNER FERTILITY 1 (2005), available at http://www.irp.wisc.edu/
research/childsup/csde/publications/brito_05.pdf.  For data on family complexity in
TANF families, see sources cited supra note 15. R
142 Nepomnyaschy, supra note 138, at 95.  Moreover, formal punitive child support R
policies may encourage fathers to cease involvement in their children’s lives. Id. at 109.
143 See Maldonado, supra note 70, at 1014 (suggesting that child support enforcement R
is of “little or no benefit” to children of poor fathers because the money goes to the state,
the benefits of child support receipt are not as high when made non-voluntarily, and
formal enforcement may lead to greater conflict between parents).
144 See sources cited supra note 125. R
145 See, e.g., MARY FARRELL, MICHAEL FISHMAN, STEPHANIE LAUD & VINCENA ALLEN,
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., UNDERSTANDING THE AFDC/TANF CHILD-ONLY
CASELOAD:  POLICIES, COMPOSITION, AND CHARACTERISTICS IN THREE STATES (2000),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/HSP/child-only-caseload00/execsum.htm (stating that as
a condition of receiving TANF benefits, parents must assign child support rights to the
state; this condition often applies to relative caregivers as well).
146 Naomi R. Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95
MICH. L. REV. 965, 975–76 (1997) (arguing that the “cooperation” requirement is really
a way to impose morality, and that, although race-neutral, the requirement still involves
race as it may affect the caseworker’s perception of her client and the income potential of
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Welfare recipients who have children with multiple partners are subject to
these assumptions, and, at the same time, receive little advantage from their
participation in child support enforcement.147  In contrast to the forced coop-
eration requirement for welfare recipients, mothers who are not welfare re-
cipients and not obligated to cooperate with the state frequently choose not
to enforce child support obligations.148  State enforcement also punishes poor
women “by linking benefits to specific behaviors,” which may be exacer-
bated for parents who have children with multiple partners.149  Fiscal savings
carried out through tough enforcement punishes individual women without
fiscal benefit to the state.  The new theory of limited equalization rejects
fiscal savings because it ineffectively prioritizes federal and state economic
interests over children’s interests.150
B. The Goal of Children’s Economic Well-being Is Based on False
Assumptions About Dissolving Nuclear Families and Ignores
Poverty Prevention
Current support laws do not serve the goal of improving children’s eco-
nomic well-being and have further damaged the economic well-being of
poor and complex families.  As conceived, the goal of improving children’s
the father); Turetsky, supra note 59, at 402 (arguing for distribution reform); see also R
WALLER, supra note 139, at 118–35 (analyzing interviews with unmarried parents whose R
children receive support and demonstrating the ways in which forced cooperation and
enforcement were detrimental to children).  The forced cooperation requirement has been
especially criticized for its impact on domestic violence victims. See, e.g, Jyl Josephson,
The Intersectionality of Domestic Violence and Welfare in the Lives of Poor Women, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND CULTURE
83 (Natalie Sokoloff ed., 2005).
147 The very limited exception is that the first $50 per month of child support col-
lected by states is ordinarily remitted to the family and not counted as income.  Hatcher,
supra note 122, at 1030. R
148 Of the 13.6 million custodial parents in 2006, fewer than fifty-eight percent had
legal support agreements. U.S. BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS, supra note
13, at 5.  Of the custodial parents without orders, twenty-four percent said that they did R
not have an order because of the noncustodial parents’ inability to pay. Id.; see also
Chien-Chung Huang & Hillard Pouncy, Why Doesn’t She Have a Child Support Order?
Personal Choice or Objective Constraint, 54 FAM. REL. 547, 552 (2005) (finding in one
study that two groups — young and highly educated mothers — were more likely to cite
personal choice for not having a support order); Garrison, supra note 139, at 16 (noting R
that women report that they do not want to pursue an award for a variety of reasons,
including a belief that the father does not have the funds, a belief that the father would
not pay even if he had the funds, a fear of retaliation or domestic violence, or a belief that
contested litigation would interfere with the parents’ relationship or the parent-child
relationship).
149 JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 131. R
150 Even within the standard paradigm, the fiscal savings goal has been widely criti-
qued. See, e.g., JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 149–50 (noting that child support policy R
ignores the state’s role in using state resources to support “ostensibly economically inde-
pendent families” and turns focus away from “collective responsibilities for the support
and well-being of children”).
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economic well-being is based on faulty assumptions, and it is too narrowly
construed to be workable for multiple families.
First, the child support system fails to achieve this goal because it only
applies to a small subset of families: the goal is designed to protect the fi-
nancial situation of children in one cohabitating family that is dissolving.
The premise is that children should not be economically harmed by the dis-
solution of a family and that children should not bear the brunt of the extra
costs associated with establishing two homes.151  While this goal may, at
most, serve children whose parents were living together at some point, it
ignores the interests of children raised in other settings.152  Additionally, this
goal frequently fails even under the standard paradigm because “child sup-
port policies do not actually contemplate ‘equalization’ of the standards of
living in the residential and nonresidential households.”153  Although there is
seemingly nothing objectionable about preventing children from bearing the
costs of dissolution, it is unclear how this goal is implemented, given that
state child support guidelines are based on parents’ income.  Moreover, eco-
nomic well-being is important to all children, not just those who were once
in cohabitating families.
Although child support laws attempt to protect children from the eco-
nomic costs associated with family dissolution, this goal is challenging in
multiple families, even if one believes it is a legitimate goal.  Child support
laws cannot offset the costs of family dissolution because “two households
cannot live as cheaply as one.”154  Child support policy simply cannot “raise
the income of a child support obligor or recreate the economies of scale
available to an intact household.”155  If income is divided equally, two (or
more) households may end up in poverty.156  Absent substantial resources,
economic well-being is difficult to achieve where there are numerous house-
holds requiring financial support.
Moreover, the child support system has not met the goal of enhancing
children’s economic well-being for many of the low-income complex fami-
lies in the child support system.  Economic well-being is narrowly defined to
151 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.04 cmt. c (recognizing “widespread eco- R
nomic inadequacy in one-parent families” as a “grievous harm to children,” thereby
justifying social involvement).  However, the Comments recognize and defer to the inter-
ests of high-income parents reaping the benefits of their labor. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 6, § 3.04 cmt. d; see also David S. Rosettenstein, Speculating on Stock Options and R
Child Support: Long on Income and Short on Value (and Theory) — A Jurisprudential
Attempt at a Butterfly Straddle?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 947, 952 (2004) (noting that the Princi-
ples accept that the higher-income parent is entitled to a higher standard of living).
152 See Katharine K. Baker, Supporting Children, Balancing Lives, 34 PEPP. L. REV.
359, 365–69 (2007) (critiquing the basis of an “intact” household as the norm for deter-
mining support awards where it is not the majority of households).
153 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.04 cmt. i. R
154 Garrison, supra note 139, at 24. R
155 Id.
156 Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 539, 580–90 (1990).
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address only the child’s immediate financial needs and does not account for
poverty prevention.  “Economic well-being” exists in the context of protect-
ing the economic situation of one family at dissolution, while “poverty pre-
vention” is a larger and more expansive goal.  Poverty prevention is not an
explicit goal of child support guidelines, although poverty may be a by-
product of lack of support for children.157  The most recent National Child
Support Strategic Plan only loosely touches on poverty, and not at all in the
context of multiple families.158  Although inadequate child support certainly
contributes to poverty of complex families,159 even full enforcement of all
existing support orders would have a minimal effect on reduction of poverty
or welfare dependency.160  Moreover, child support laws usually ignore the
actual financial needs of poor women;161 these laws also tend to prefer the
interests of the nonresident parent.162  For families on welfare (and thus not
receiving child support), economic security is an illusion, given the low
amounts of welfare payments, particularly where recipients have multiple
children.163
Enhanced enforcement measures are also insufficient to address the
problem of children living in poverty.164  Problems with compliance are par-
ticularly difficult in low-income families, partially because low-income fa-
thers may have disproportionately higher child support awards than higher-
157 See Garrison, supra note 139, at 19 (“Only a few states utilize guidelines that take R
poverty prevention as an objective; none aim at maintaining the child’s living standard or
even at equalizing living standard loss.”); Ronald K. Henry, Child Support at a Cross-
roads: When the Real World Intrudes Upon Academics and Advocates, 33 FAM. L.Q. 235,
253 (1999) (criticizing “Robin Hood” assumptions in child support and impact on high-
income fathers).
158 The Plan addresses poverty by distinguishing between those who refuse to pay
and those who cannot pay and by desiring to improve enforcement and collection in the
“underground” economy. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 102, at R
12.
159 Garrison, supra note 139, at 16–18; see also Engel, supra note 16, at 313 (study- R
ing the impact of remarriage on women’s financial situations).
160 ANDREA H. BELLER & WILLIAM J. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF
CHILD SUPPORT 212, 232 (Yale Univ. Press 1996).  Even families with fully enforced
support orders may still be poor. JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 151. R
161 JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 144. R
162 See Marsha Garrison, Child Support Policy: Guidelines and Goals, 33 FAM. L.Q.
157, 159 (1999) (noting that guidelines fail to avert poverty because they were not de-
signed with this goal in mind).  Garrison explains that “child support policy can avert a
child’s poverty only if that poverty derives from an income loss associated with family
dissolution or non-formation.” Id. at 175.
163 See, e.g., Donald Tobin, Investing in Our Children, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 457,
507–09 (2004) (arguing that we should spend more money on the welfare of children and
discussing studies showing that families on public benefits spend their benefits on
necessities).
164 See Elrod, supra note 42, at 708; see also Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fa- R
therhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 325, 371–74 (2005) (asserting that increased child support
enforcement has largely failed to reduce child poverty).
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income fathers.165  In multiple families without resources, compliance with
support orders is even less likely.166  Child support awards based on parental
income cannot support children’s economic well-being if the parents have no
income or are unable to comply with multiple child support orders.167
Through limited equalization, child support policy would focus on the actual
economic needs of children and on poverty prevention in complex families.
Instead of a definition of “economic well-being” that is unattainable given
family demographics, child support policy should be refocused on poverty
prevention.
C. The Goal of Parental Involvement Limits Public Responsibility for
Children and Uses Child Support as a Proxy for Involvement
Although federal child support laws aim to encourage parental respon-
sibility, this goal is flawed and unrealized for several reasons.  First, “paren-
tal responsibility” masks governmental unwillingness to care for children by
focusing on the private failures of individual fathers.168  Focusing on the pri-
vate failures of individuals may lead to parents who have children with mul-
tiple partners being further demonized for failing to “take responsibility.”
Child support laws have “constructed the problem as one of ‘deadbeat dads’
165 See, e.g., Daniel Meyer & Judi Bartfeld, Compliance with Child Support Orders in
Divorce Cases, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 201 (1996); see also D.C. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDE-
LINE COMMISSION, supra note 76, pt. II, ch. 2, at 9 (citing a 2000 HHS Study demonstrat- R
ing the need to focus on ability to pay, rather than imputed income).
166 See SORENSON, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 23, at 6, 31–32 (obligors with more R
than one order owed twice as much of the arrears as compared to obligors with one
order).  Moreover, the median percent of current support paid by obligors with multiple
orders was thirty-six percent, as compared to sixty-two percent for those with one order.
Id. at 66–67.
167 This concern is relevant in the context of child support issues that arise for incar-
cerated parents.  See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., INCARCERATION, REENTRY AND CHILD SUPPORT ISSUES: NATIONAL AND
STATE RESEARCH OVERVIEW REPORT 2, 4 (2006), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cse/pubs/2006/reports/incarceration_report.pdf (relying on Bureau of Justice
Statistics, noting that sixty-three percent of federal and fifty-six percent of state prisoners
have children under the age of eighteen and that many prisoners enter prison with preex-
isting child support debt); see also Solangel Maldonado, Recidivism and Paternal En-
gagement, 40 FAM. L.Q. 191, 192 (2006) (arguing that parental involvement of
incarcerated fathers benefits children and society).
168 See Mary Jane Mossman, Child Support or Support for Children — Re-Thinking
Public and Private in Family Law, 46 U. N.B. L.J. 63, 75 (1997) (describing how defin-
ing the “public problem of ‘support for children’ has been reprivatized as the problem of
deadbeat dads”); see also Altman, supra note 26, at 174–75 (suggesting that “we should R
understand private child support duties primarily as remedies for parental wrongs” such
as failing to demonstrate love to the child); Nancy Dowd, supra note 68, at 19, 30 (1995) R
(“[P]ublic income transfers far overshadow private transfers as sources of single-parent
income.”); Fineman, supra note 71, at 209 (writing that federal child support laws ob- R
scure the public need to “take responsibility for children beyond the private family”).
Additionally, the ALI Principles recognize that the United States is unique among “other
wealthy Western countries” because of its “disinclination to act as a primary guarantor of
children’s economic adequacy.” ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.04 cmt. h. R
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and the corresponding solution as a package of mandatory guidelines and
more effective enforcement mechanisms.”169  As a result, “the power to de-
fine the social problem of child support and appropriate solutions has been
used strategically to narrow the parameters of public critique of these pro-
posals.”170  By focusing on private payment, child support laws ignore what
Martha Fineman calls the universal problem of dependency.171  Although pa-
rental responsibility is important, it should not be used to deny the need for
government assistance for complex families or to limit the scope of the prob-
lem.  Instead, child support policy should widen support responsibility, both
publicly and privately, to assist multiple families.
Second, defining “parental responsibility” only in terms of private for-
mal economic child support incorrectly equates “parental responsibility”
with economic payment.172  The child support guidelines “are not designed
to have any direct effect on children’s emotional or psychological well-be-
ing, their self-esteem, their identity, or their relationship with either par-
ent.”173  However, child support, whether formal or informal, is only one
component of parenting.174  Although the most recent National Strategic Plan
observes the importance of actual parental involvement, its comments are
limited and do not refer to multiple families.175
The relationship between child support and child contact is complicated
and the subject of widespread disagreement.176 This relationship may be even
more complicated in multiple families.177  Numerous studies have examined
the relationship between support and involvement, albeit inconclusively.178
169 Mossman, supra note 168, at 65 (discussing the framing of this issue in Canada R
and the fundamental limitations of guidelines).
170 Id.
171 Fineman, supra note 71, at 219 (child support is only “one component of a com- R
plex series of issues surrounding the question of who should bear the economic and social
costs of caring for dependent members of society”).  Brenda Cossman explains how child
support and welfare have been used to privatize dependency partially.  Brenda Cossman,
Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 442–59 (2005).
172 Even if one recognizes the importance of parents fulfilling the responsibilities and
obligations that attach to parenthood, one might criticize the public accountability rheto-
ric of this goal.
173 JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 45 (explaining that the program’s mechanisms are R
legal and economic).
174 Edythe Krampe, Book Note, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 500, 500 (2003) (finding
that both fathers and mothers believe good fathering requires more than economic
support).
175 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 102, at 6 (observing broad R
recognitions such as, “[a] legal and emotional relationship between parents and children
is essential”).
176 See Nepomnyaschy, supra note 138, at 109. R
177 None of the studies described below focus on complex families.
178 A full analysis of these studies is outside the scope of this article.  Correlations
may exist between any number of variables, including payment, contact, and the formal-
ity of the support. See, e.g., Nepomnyaschy, supra note 138, at 105–08.  Visitation may R
provide an opportunity to exchange informal support. Id. at 108; see also Maldonado,
supra note 70, at 961–62 (citing studies that children do better when their fathers pay R
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As a legal matter, visitation and support typically have limited, or no, con-
nection.179  One exception is that even where child support compliance and
visitation are not explicitly linked, the time a child spends with a parent
usually has an effect on the calculation of the child support order, which
depends on the model employed by state-specific child support guidelines.
For example, some states have parenting-time adjustments so that increased
time with a child over a certain threshold may reduce the amount owed.180
However, linking the calculation to visitation may give parents room to ma-
nipulate visitation to decrease payments.181  The current trend is toward dis-
connecting visitation and support.182  Regardless, many parents perceive or
experience a real connection between support and visitation.183  Child sup-
port policy should examine what “parental responsibility” should mean
when a parent has more than one child with different partners.  Encouraging
parents to provide economic support for complex families should only be
one component of child support policy.
As implemented, each of the three goals for federal involvement in
child support fails for multiple families.  Accordingly, new goals are needed
to reflect the complexities of families today.  Until new goals exist, states
that implement the three goals of federal child support policy through their
state child support guidelines will continue to disserve children in multiple
families.  Limited equalization, described more fully below, reflects a new
policy choice that prioritizes supporting existing children while expanding
the available resources for all children.
child support and discussing link to visitation); Laura W. Morgan with Chuck Shively,
The Link Between Visitation and Support Compliance (2000), http://www.childsupport
guidelines.com/articles/art200012.html (writing that “efforts to increase contact will not
necessarily result in more child support” though “efforts to enforce compliance with
payment of child support could lead to more child contact”).
179 See Morgan, supra note 178. R
180 See Jane C. Venohr & Tracy E. Griffith, Child Support Guidelines: Issues and
Reviews, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 415, 424 (2005) (showing states that allow for a time-sharing
adjustment).
181 See Beld & Biernat, supra note 42, at 198–99 (discussing relevant incentives). R
182 See Karen Czapanskiy, Child Support and Visitation: Rethinking the Connections,
20 RUTGERS L.J. 619, 619 (1989).  The ALI recognizes “some reciprocal relationship
between support and access”; interference with access is not a defense to nonpayment
and vice versa, but permit orders may be modified based on interference with access and
nonpayment. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.14(3) cmt. a. R
183 See Estin, supra note 133, at 1078 (discussing the empirical and clinical studies R
that document the connection between visitation and child support); Lin & McLanahan,
supra note 14, at 392 (finding the “correlation between obligations and rights is posi- R
tively related for mothers but not for fathers”); Judith A. Seltzer, Sara S. McLanahan &
Thomas L. Hanson, Will Child Support Enforcement Increase Father-Child Contact and
Parental Conflict after Separation?, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE, supra note 7, at 174–79 R
(suggesting that stricter child support enforcement is likely to increase fathers’ influence
over their children but the effects may not be causally connected); see also Maldonado,
supra note 67, at 923 (providing informal support often provides an opportunity to fathers R
to see their children); Nepomnyaschy, supra note 138, at 95 (formal punitive child sup- R
port policies may encourage fathers to cease involvement in their children’s lives).
The complexity of the relationship between parental involvement and child support for
multiple families should be explored further.
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V. STATE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES RESOLVE ISSUES OF RESOURCE
ALLOCATION IN MULTIPLE FAMILIES WITHOUT
FEDERAL GUIDANCE
None of the federal child support laws or goals specifically addresses a
parent’s obligation to children in two or more families.  In the face of near
federal silence on child support issues for complex families, states are left
with the task of creating state guidelines without any federal policy gui-
dance.  This has led to ineffective child support guidelines and is especially
detrimental to parents with complex families living in poverty.  New child
support goals would assist states in developing guidelines that account for
family complexity.  States should be transparent about policy decisions that
have an effect on multiple families, particularly in deciding how to allocate
scarce resources among families.  In implementing limited equalization,
states should clearly state their substantive criteria and articulate how those
criteria meet the new goals of child support.
A. The Dilemma for Guideline Models: “First Family First”
or “Equalization”
Several models for child support guidelines exist, most notably the in-
come-shares model and the percentage-of-income model.184  All of the child
support guideline models are based on economic data and analysis,185 and
many factors influence how much support a family receives.186  The income-
shares model is currently the most common model.187  Under this model, the
child support amount is derived from the combined income of the parents,
with the amount owed determined by apportioning a percentage of the com-
184 See MORGAN, supra note 6, § 1.03(b), 1–15, for examples. R
185 For example, every four years states must revise their guidelines and consider
economic data on the costs of raising children.  Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-485, § 128, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).  There has been little criticism of the failure to
recognize the false neutrality of economic studies that themselves rely on hidden assump-
tions. See Ira Mark Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to Construct
Child Support Guidelines, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 167, 169 (2004) (questioning the seem-
ing neutrality of reliance on economic models of determining appropriate child support
amounts).  For example, the models used to study the costs of raising children are ordina-
rily based on a heterosexual two-parent family.  Additionally, estimates of actual costs of
child-rearing are notoriously inaccurate. See Beld & Biernat, supra note 42, at 173–75 R
(describing how income-shares is more accurate).  Moreover, one could argue that, at
least in high-income families, the “economics” of child support is only activated when
love “fails”: where parental altruism is insufficient.  Estin, supra note 133, at 1070 (ex- R
ploring the intersection of economics and the law of the family).
186 Child support trends from 1968 to 1997 reveal that payments decreased in the
1970s and 1980s and began to rise in the mid-1980s and 1990s.  Case, Lin & McLana-
han, supra note 11, at 179.  Inflation and declines in the wages of low-skilled fathers may R
also lower awards.
187 Venohr & Griffith, supra note 180, at 417 (stating that at least thirty-three states R
used the income-shares model in 2004).
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bined income to each parent.188  The second most common child support
guideline model is the percentage-of-income model, in which only the obli-
gor’s income is factored into the support calculation and the residential par-
ent’s income is not considered.189  The non-residential parent is automatically
the obligor, which differs from the income-shares model.190   In addition to
the income-shares and percentage-of-income models, several hybrid meth-
ods of calculation exist.191  Child support orders for multiple families can be
generated under each of these guideline models.  Each of these models ar-
guably reflects the federal goals of child support, particularly the assump-
tions about dividing households.192  Each of these guideline models has
different consequences for complex families.193
At issue is how state guidelines account for children born to parents
who already have children with previous partners.  Should the children in the
two (or more) families be treated the same, “with a similar claim on the
parent’s resources, or are the children from the first family entitled to be
given a higher priority?”194  As Laura Morgan correctly observes, the issue
is “whether a parent should be prevented from taking on additional child
support responsibilities to the possible detriment of children in need of sup-
port or whether all children should be treated equally regardless of the par-
ent’s behavior.”195  Despite the seriousness of these questions, federal child
support goals and laws are silent on the issue.
The two primary ways to allocate child support among families are
“first family first” and “equalization.”196  The “first family first” policy is
premised on the concept of child support as a “nondisclaimable duty that
should not be altered by activities chosen by the obligor.”197  The rationale is
that permitting retrospective modification gives no incentive to parents to
avoid having additional children and in fact may provide an incentive to
have additional children, where having additional children leads to a reduc-
188 See Beld & Biernat, supra note 42, at 173–75. R
189 Susan A. Reorich, Making Ends Meet: Toward Fair Calculation of Child Support
When Obligors Must Support Both Prior and Subsequent Children, 20 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 967, 974–75 (1994) (describing the percentage of income model); Venohr & Grif-
fith, supra note 180, at 421 (stating that at least thirteen states used this model in 2004). R
190 Reorich, supra note 189, at 974–75. R
191 For example, under the Melson formula, which applies in only two or three states,
an income-shares approach exists up until basic needs are met, with the system switching
to percentage-of-income for the obligor once the basic needs of the child and parent are
met. See Venohr & Griffith, supra note 180, at 417 (stating that only Delaware, Hawaii R
and Montana used this model in 2004).
192 For example, one concept behind income-shares is that a child should receive the
same proportion of parental income that he or she would have received if the parents had
not divorced, or the share he or she would have received if the parents lived together in
an “intact” household. See MORGAN, supra note 6, § 1.03(b). R
193 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 109, pt. II, at 106–12. R
194 Minow, supra note 7, at 309. R
195 MORGAN, supra note 6, § 3.04(b)(1). R
196 See Thompson, supra note 5, at 250. R
197 Minow, supra note 7, at 320. R
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tion in required child support payments.198  In practice, in calculating support
orders for subsequent children under the “first family first” policy, judicial
deference is ordinarily given to existing support orders for children born
from prior relationships.199  As of 2004, at least forty state guidelines “pro-
vide that a parent’s preexisting order is to be subtracted from the parent’s
income prior to the determination of support.”200  The ALI Principles explain
the favoring of first families through the prior support deduction as follows:
A rule of strict equality among children of different families would
require recalculation of existing child-support orders for children
not before the court and perhaps not even subject to the court’s
jurisdiction.  A rule of priority is independently justifiable in equi-
table terms.  A parent may be understood to come to a second
family already economically diminished by obligations to a prior
family, as by obligations to other creditors whose claims are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.  Prior obligations should not, as a
general matter, be retroactively reduced in light of obligations sub-
sequently undertaken.201
“Equalization,” the second way to allocate child support among fami-
lies, calls for “equal treatment of all the children of a particular parent” on
the basis that “[h]ad the parents stayed together and produced additional
children, there would have been adjustments and a likely reduction in the
resources available for the first child.”202  “Equalization” supporters argue
that the “first family first” policy limits the freedom to form new families203
and that denying modifications interferes with a parent’s ability to support
additional children.204  Without any federal policy guidance in support of
“equalization” or “first family first,” the predominant rule has become to
give a preference to the first family.205
In choosing between “equalization” or “first family first,” one must
consider the underlying assumptions about families and the goals of child
support policy.  As Martha Minow explains, we may be concerned about the
freedom to form new families, troubled by family instability, or protective of
existing children; each concern results in different policy choices.206  The
198 See id. at 309.
199 MORGAN, supra note 6, § 3.04(a).  The ALI Principles also require the subtraction R
of prior child support obligations from the obligor’s income. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note
6, § 3.14(3) (limiting the reduction to payments that are actually made). R
200 Venohr & Griffith, supra note 180, at 425.  However, even this policy is problem- R
atic in that it is the child support order itself that counts as a deduction, rather than
compliance with the order.
201 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.14 cmt. i. R
202 See Minow, supra note 7, at 309. R
203 Id.
204 See id. at 315.
205 This preference is minimized by deviations and deductions, as discussed infra
note 280. R
206 Minow writes:
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composition of the family and one’s views about alternative or nontraditional
families may compound the dilemma of which policy to choose.  For exam-
ple, “should it matter whether the new child is biologically the parent’s or is
a stepchild?”207  Would it matter whether or not the family was married?
Heterosexual?  Whether the first child’s standard of living would be better or
worse than the second child’s?208  Would it matter whether or not child sup-
port policy motivated behavior or had an effect on children?209  Without fed-
eral guidance, multiple families are shoehorned into existing state child
support guidelines.
Child support guidelines treat existing children in several different
ways, often depending upon the model used.210  In the income-shares model,
the “first family first” policy typically applies to existing children, along
with the possibility of deductions and modifications for both parents.211  De-
spite the ostensible simplicity of “first family first,” numerous complica-
tions may arise.  For example, the first family may not have an existing child
support order in place prior to the birth of subsequent children.  In this situa-
tion, the question in determining the award for a “first family” child is
whether or not to count subsequent children in the “number of children”
portion of the calculation.212  For example, the court could apply the guide-
lines only to the children before the court, or the court could apply the guide-
lines to all the children that the parent is obligated to support and then
prorate the total support for the children at issue.213  Typically courts con-
sider only the children whose support is at issue in defining the number of
If one is concerned about the noncustodial parent’s freedom to move on and form
a new family, surely he should be able to reduce his preexisting child support
duty.  If one is concerned about the child in the first relationship and worried that
even the original child support order fails to bring that child up to the nonresiden-
tial parent’s standard of living, a downward adjustment seems unfair and unwise.
If one is troubled by family instability and the prospect of men fathering children
with a series of different women, reinforcing the responsibilities of fatherhood
seems important.  Yet if one imagines that both parents have moved on to new
relationships with new lovers and new children, the economic burdens the child
support duty imposes on the nonresident parent seem unfair.
Minow, supra note 7, at 310. R
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Numerous studies examine whether or not the existence of a child support order,
or strong enforcement, deters remarriage or having new children. See, e.g., BELLER &
GRAHAM, supra note 160, at 212 (arguing that child support policies do not deter remar-
riage). But see David E. Bloom, Cecilia Conrad & Cynthia Miller, Child Support and
Fathers’ Remarriage and Fertility, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE, supra note 7, at 128–29.  The R
effect may also be different for men than for women and among low-income men. Id. at
132, 146.
210 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. R
211 MORGAN, supra note 6, §3.04(b). R
212 Id.  Additionally, if the new children are part of a cohabitating family, any paren-
tal support obligation for them would not be court-ordered.
213 Id. § 2.02.  Morgan explains some of the perverse financial issues associated with
calculating the obligation the second way. Id.
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children.214  Under state guidelines, preexisting children may be handled as a
deviation factor, or through calculating a “multiple family” order.215  Guide-
lines rarely have explicit procedures for calculating child support orders for
existing children where more than one new family is formed.
Under the guideline models, states handle subsequent children in calcu-
lating child support orders in a variety of ways:216 as a mandatory required
income deduction, as a discretionary income deduction, as a deviation factor,
as a component of a self-serve reserve, or by providing no accommoda-
tion.217  Subsequent children are often considered in a motion to modify a
child support order for existing children.218  As a practical matter, permitting
deviations or deductions may eliminate the advantages to the first family,
thus rendering the “first family first” policy meaningless.219  Where parents
have multiple subsequent children with different partners, providing accom-
modation to the subsequent children may result in low awards for all
children.
Regardless of the method of accommodating subsequent children, sev-
eral complications arise.  One issue is whether both residential and nonresi-
dential parents may consider subsequent children as a means to reduce a
child support obligation for an existing child.220  Several states allow only
the nonresidential parent to claim “credit” for the subsequent children.221
Allowing only nonresident parents to claim a deduction for subsequent chil-
dren may have a disproportionate impact on mothers; most nonresident par-
214 Id.
215 Id. § 3.04(a).  Note that even the principle of first orders first is ripe for abuse.
See id. at 3-47.
216 Id. § 3.04(b), at 3–50 tbls.3, 4, 5 & 6 (noting that states treat the addition of
children in more varied ways than they do in the presence of existing children); see also
Reorich, supra note 189, at 972 (stating that although the federal government required all R
states to have guidelines, each state chooses which model to apply).
217 See MORGAN, supra note 6, § 3.04(b) (listing which states use which methods); R
see also Venohr & Griffith, supra note 180, at 423–24 (listing which states use a self- R
support reserve).
218 See, e.g., Marvin M. Moore, The Significance of a Divorced Father’s Remarriage
in Adjudicating a Motion to Modify His Child Support Obligations, 18 CAP. U. L. REV.
483, 483 (1989) (discussing motions to modify based on father’s remarriage).
219 The ALI Principles permit a parent’s subsequent acquisition of child-related re-
sponsibilities to be treated as a deduction in some circumstances.  ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 6, § 3.16 cmt. b, illus. 1.  This “hardship” exception offsets the first family priority R
by allowing for a deduction for “extraordinary health-care expenditure for that parent or
a person to whom the parent has a legal or moral duty of support” or “the basic con-
sumption needs of the parent’s children who reside with the parent and for whom deduc-
tion has not already been taken.” Id. § 3.16.
220 In percentage-of-income states, the income of the residential parent is not consid-
ered, so there is little basis for considering the subsequent children of the resident parent.
In the income-shares states, the issue is whether the obligor and obligee are treated equi-
tably with regard to being benefited or burdened by the role of subsequent children in
support obligations.  For a residential parent, the issue is whether or not the parent would
receive an income deduction for the costs associated with subsequent children where they
are not the obligor for the existing child or children.
221 MORGAN, supra note 6, § 3.04(b) n.146 (listing Mississippi, New York, and South R
Carolina as states that consider the obligor’s children only for deductions or deviations).
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ents are fathers who receive the benefit of the deduction while mothers do
not.222  Other states provide that acquiring a new support duty may be used
“defensively” — to defend a motion for an upward modification — but may
not be used “offensively” — to seek a downward modification on the basis
of having new children.223  To calculate the amount of child support to be
reduced, some states use the actual expenses of subsequent children,224 while
others craft a hypothetical child support order for the subsequent children.225
Where parents are supporting multiple families, allowing numerous deduc-
tions may lead to child support orders that are unrealistically low for each of
the families, particularly among low-income families.226
Another issue relevant under any model is the extent to which child
support orders reflect new families’ resources.227  States rarely consider the
income of a new spouse or cohabitant because there is no legal duty of sup-
port to the existing children.228  This rule may have a gendered effect where
it is custodial mothers who would be more likely to benefit from including
stepparent income.229  Rationales underlying the exclusion of stepfamilies
from parental rights and responsibilities are the preference for “the biologi-
cal parent-child relationship as the exclusive model of family responsibil-
ity,” and the economic “unfairness” of extending obligations to non-
biological family members.230  The general rule disfavoring stepparent obli-
gations may also be based on assumptions about how stepfamilies handle
222 See id. § 1.03(c) (describing percentage of income models).
223 Morgan, supra note 30, at 3–5 (explaining that one rationale for forbidding the R
offensive use is the assumption that the decision to have additional children should not be
a vehicle to reduce prior obligations); see also MORGAN, supra note 6, § 3.04(b) n.136 R
(listing states that only permit “defensive” motions).
224 MORGAN, supra note 6, § 3.04(b)(2). R
225 Id. Note that this can result in a substantial reduction.  Another method, which
has not been used in the United States, is to combine all children into a “total number” to
devise a common order. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 248–53 (comparing the Cana- R
dian, English, and American approaches).
226 For families on welfare, the issue of deviations and deductions is less salient be-
cause the welfare recipient receives a set amount of public benefits.  For further discus-
sion of issues arising from assignment of welfare recipients’ child support rights to the
states, see supra note 143 and accompanying text. R
227 Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 539, 587 (1990) (describing alternative justifications for increasing or de-
creasing a child support order); see MAHONEY, supra note 30, at 44. R
228 Minow, supra note 7, at 316.  Another approach, which has not been embraced by R
the American legal system, is to look at all of the people and resources that could provide
support to a child and to prohibit downward modification if the first family is highly
dependent upon the payor. Id. at 317; see also Clayton P. Kawski, Stepping Income:
Evaluating the Inherent Inconsistency of Illinois’s Trend Toward Consideration of New
Spouse Income in Child Support Modification, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 247, 258–70 (2007)
(examining the extent to which Illinois considers new spouse income).  Generally speak-
ing, the income of a parent’s current spouse or partner is not taken into account but may
be imputed in limited circumstances. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.14 cmts. c, g. R
229 Morgan, supra note 30, at 1 (citing projections that one in three children will R
spend some time in a stepfamily and noting that a majority of stepparents are men).
230 MAHONEY, supra note 30, at 14.  Note that stepparents may assume rights and R
responsibilities regardless of the presence or absence of a biological parent. Id.
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money and whether or not their resources should be or are merged.231  If
child support guidelines included the availability of a stepparent’s income or
a cohabitant’s income, this inclusion would probably increase child support
payment calculations for children living in multiple families.
At the poverty level, low-income families are in a double-bind regard-
ing new partner income and child support.  Welfare recipients who create
new families are excluded from the rule disfavoring counting the income of
new partners because of the relationship between state support laws and the
definition of a dependent under welfare law.232  Specifically, many children
may be excluded from AFDC because welfare regulations may include a
portion of a stepparent’s income in calculating the child’s need for welfare
assistance.233  Federal child support policy should therefore consider the
availability of new spouse or cohabitant income for multiple families and
provide guidance to states for how to account for this income in their
guidelines.
B. State Child Support Guidelines as Applied to Multiple Families
Consider the blended families described below.234  Maryann is a thirty-
four-year-old woman raising three children.  Maryann made $16,000 per
year, but has been laid off.  Maryann’s oldest son is Jake, who is twelve, and
her oldest daughter is Felicia, who is eight.  Felicia and Jake’s father is J.T.
J.T., who is thirty-one, is a car mechanic making about $19,000 annually.
J.T. and Maryann have never lived together.  J.T. visits Felicia, Jake, and
Maryann periodically but he has never maintained a formal visitation sched-
ule.  Maryann invites J.T. to family events and he usually attends, bringing
small presents for Felicia and Jake.  When Jake was a baby, J.T. did not have
a job, so he spent more time with Jake and Maryann.  When Maryann asks,
J.T. will babysit if he has time.
J.T. has two other children, Sam (age four) and Bettie (age two) with
whom he does not live but informally supports.  Their mother is Janette, who
has no income.  Maryann also has another child who lives with her, Beatrice,
who is five.  Beatrice’s dad is Peter.  Peter, who is twenty-nine, works for a
shipping company and makes $35,000 per year.  Peter lives with Anna, a
231 Engel, supra note 16, at 317 (describing the ways in which stepfamilies may han- R
dle money, including one method where resources of the new families are merged and
another where the stepfamilies keep their finances distinct and allocate based on biology).
232 MAHONEY, supra note 30, at 48–51 (discussing the relationship between AFDC R
and stepparent support).
233 Id. at 51.  For example, in Pennsylvania, stepparent income may be taken into
account when determining state support. See 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 432.12(c)
(1996).
234 For the sake of simplicity, this hypothetical describes a limited complex family
situation in which each existing parent has had subsequent children with only one other
person.  A truly complex multiple family might involve subsequent children with more
parents.  Additionally, this scenario is based on a heterosexual blended family in order to
reflect a scenario that would require a duty of support in all states.
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paralegal who makes $50,000 annually.  Anna has two children from a pre-
vious relationship.  Maryann does not have any child support orders, and she
currently receives approximately $460 monthly in welfare assistance.235  As
a condition of accepting welfare, Maryann has assigned her rights to child
support to the state.  If her child support payments were more than welfare,
presumably she would receive child support instead of welfare.236  This tree






















There are several different outcomes, following one common income-
shares child support guideline model, under which Maryann is entitled to
support from both J.T. and Peter.237  Looking first at support for Felicia and
Jake, if Maryann obtained a child support order based on J.T.’s income
before he had subsequent children, he would owe approximately $546
monthly to Maryann for Felicia and Jake’s support.  However, if Maryann
did not have a child support order in place for Felicia and Jake until after
Sam and Bettie were born, there would be a question of how to “count” Sam
and Bettie in making child support orders after their births.238  If Sam and
Bettie lived with J.T., he would receive an income deduction for them, and
235 See D.C., DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., IMA POLICY MANUAL pt. VI, ch. 8.5, http://
dhs.dc.gov/dhs/cwp/view,a,1345,q,604418,dhsNav_GID,1728,.asp (last visited Dec. 1,
2008) (using $463 as a standard allowance for three children in one of the examples).
Exhibit 4 lists the standard allowance as $523. Id.  The D.C. statutes do not include the
amounts of TANF assistance, but do regulate the administration of TANF through the
local agency. See D.C. CODE §§ 4-202.01–4-218.01 (2007).
236 This example illustrates the limitations of child support policy for very poor fami-
lies.  For example, if J.T. or Peter had no income or made below their state’s self-serve
reserve, the issue of dividing limited resources among the families would not be signifi-
cant because the welfare payment would be more than any proposed child support order.
237 All subsequent numbers in this example are based on the D.C. CODE § 16-916.01
(2007) and the D.C. child support calculator, D.C. Office of the Att’y Gen., D.C. Child
Support Calculator, http://csgc.oag.dc.gov/application/main/intro.aspx (last visited Nov.
21, 2008).  Assume that Maryann has sole physical and legal custody of all of her chil-
dren.  None of the calculations that follow will account for child care costs, health care
costs, or any unusual expenses.  I chose Washington, D.C. because of my familiarity with
the statute, because it was recently changed to account more specifically for subsequent
children, because it is a fairly typical income-shares model, and because the D.C. govern-
ment has provided an approved child support guideline calculator online.
238 In practice, “first family first” often means the first family to obtain a child sup-
port order, not necessarily the first child by birth.  In some instances, this may encourage
a race to the courthouse to obtain a child support order. See MORGAN, supra note 7,
§ 3.04(a).
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Felicia and Jake would only receive $142 total monthly.239  If Sam and Bettie
did not live with J.T., he would only receive an income deduction for them if
he was subject to a prior support order, and the amount of the existing prior
child support order would be deducted from his income.  In contrast, some
states do not distinguish between a residential or nonresidential subsequent
child.  Under this model, Felicia and Jake would likely receive $371.240  This
example shows the range of applications when subsequent children are con-
sidered as income deductions.  This wide variety of outcomes demonstrates
how closely linked child support is to welfare: for families who are close to
the poverty line, even a small decrease in child support may push them into
poverty and public assistance.
Assuming that Janette seeks child support from J.T., the following out-
comes are possible.  If Maryann had a prior child support order, under the
standard “first family first” application, Janette would only be entitled to a
minimum amount, which in D.C. is $50,241 given J.T.’s low income.242  In
states without a self-serve reserve, however, Sam and Bettie would be more
likely to receive $200–$300.243  It is important to note that the child support
239 The award may be higher in some states.  In Minnesota, an income-shares state,
the award would be reduced to $309. See Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., Minn. Child
Support Guidelines Calculator, http://childsupportcalculator.dhs.state.mn.us/ (last visited
Dec. 1, 2008).  In a good example of the “first families first” application, if Sam and
Bettie were living with their mother, and she applied for child support after Felicia and
Jake had an existing order, Sam and Bettie would receive only $110 (the obligation is
$205, but there is a self-serve reserve).  Delaware also provides a deduction for new
residential non-joint children. CHANDLEE J. KUHN, FAM. CT. OF THE STATE OF DEL., DEL.
CHILD SUPPORT EVALUATION AND UPDATE 13–14 (2006), http://courts.delaware.gov/how
%20to/support/?childsupportguidelinesedv121106.pdf.
240 North Dakota, which follows a percentage-of-income guideline model, provides a
deduction for subsequent children whether or not they reside with the obligor. N.D.
ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-06.4 (2006).  North Dakota has a “Multiple Families Child
Support Schedule (Schedule C).” See N.D. State Court, N.D. Child Support Calculator,
www.ndcourts.com/chldspt (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).  This schedule takes into account
the number of other families, i.e., how many ways J.T.’s income needs to be allocated.
Id.  For example, if Sam and Bettie had two different mothers, the amount that Felicia and
Jake would receive would be $321. See id.  The standard order that Felicia and Jake
would have received in the absence of other children, in contrast, is $441 monthly. See
id.  Although North Dakota follows a percentage-of-income guideline model, there is no
significant difference between an income-shares or percentage-of-income guideline
model in this hypothetical because Maryann has no income.  In California, the result
would change from $518 to $370. See Cal. Dep’t of Child Support Servs., California
Guideline Child Support Calculator, http://www.childsup.cahwnet.gov/Resources/Calcu-
lateChildSupport/tabid/114/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
241 D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(g)(3) (2008) (stating the presumption that any parent is
able to contribute the minimum amount of $50 per month).
242 Venohr & Griffith, supra note 180, at 425–26.  D.C. provides a self-support re- R
serve, which is a set amount of income below which the parent’s income may not fall.  In
D.C., that income is $12,382 annually. D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(g)(1) (2008).
243 For example, the award was $262 in New Hampshire (where the first award would
have been $454).  N.H. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Child Support Calculator,
http://www.dhhs.state.nh.us/DHHS/DCSS/Child+Support+Calculator/default.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2008).  Utah’s award was $348 (where the first award would have been
$463), Utah State Cts., Online Court Assistance Program — Child Support Calculator,
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calculations above cannot answer the questions of how J.T.’s income may be
reallocated if either party moved to modify an existing child support order
because of the birth of Sam and Bettie or other new circumstances.244  In
sum, the range of child support orders for Felicia, Jake, Sam, and Bettie
could be as low as $50 and as high as $546.245
Based on his income, Peter would be obligated to pay approximately
$775 monthly to support Beatrice.  However, this does not include Anna’s
income, Anna’s two children that Peter has no duty to support, or the child
support that Maryann receives on behalf of Felicia and Jake.246  These figures
demonstrate the difference in child support amounts provided to complex
families under one limited application of a specific guideline model.
Although some state guidelines provide a mechanism to address family
complexity, state approaches vary widely.247  States handle multiple families
http://www.utcourts.gov/childsupport/calculator (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).  The award
was $363 in South Carolina (where the first award would have been $472).  Child Sup-
port Enforcement, S.C. Dep’t of Social Servs., Child Support Calculator, http://
www.state.sc.us/dss/csed/calculator.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).  There may be even
greater variance in states that calculate hypothetical orders.  Hypothetical orders refer to
the practice by which a judge calculates the support order for Child A assuming a certain
amount would apply for Child B; this assumed amount for Child B, however, is not
actually ordered or enforceable.
244 Because most states handle subsequent children as a deviation or through modifi-
cations, this hypothetical is intended to provide only a limited example of the differences
in outcome.
245 The following chart shows the range of child support outcomes for Felicia, Jake,
Sam, and Bettie:
Maryann seeks Maryann seeks Maryann seeks Janette seeks
child support child support child support child support for
from JT before from J.T. after from J.T. after Sam and Bettie
J.T. has other Sam and Bettie Sam and Bettie after Maryann has
children are born (where are born (where an order for
J.T. lives with J.T. does not live Felicia and Jake
Sam and Bettie) with Sam and
Bettie)
Felicia and Jake $546/month $142/month $370/month $546/month
(father is J.T) (range is (taken from other (without anyone
$400–$600) states because moving to
there would not modify, it would
be a deduction in remain the same)
DC unless there
was a prior order
in place for Sam
and Bettie)
Sam and Bettie N/A No order in No order in $50 (range is
(father is J.T.) place, assumes place, assumes $200–300)
J.T. contributing J.T. contributing
246 If Anna’s income and Peter’s responsibility for the two non-biological children are
both considered, Peter would owe Maryann closer to $1000 monthly.
247 BRITO, supra note 141, at 1, 15–20 (examining various state approaches).  In R
1996, the American Bar Association prepared a study for the OCSE evaluating the state
guidelines.  In this study, the ABA confirmed that there was considerable variation on
how prior orders and subsequent obligations are handled. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT EN-
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with little specific attention other than as part of a deviation or an income
deduction, as seen in the application to J.T. and Peter.248  Even though states
have managed to create ways to deal with child support for multiple fami-
lies, the lack of cohesive policy on resource allocation in multiple families
results in a lack of uniformity and variety of results.
Inconsistency can occur either between states or within states, and the
inconsistency of results demonstrates the larger problem of inconsistent pol-
icy goals for multiple families.  Frequent deviations may lead to low child
support orders for existing families.  When families move across state lines,
inconsistency may mean uncertain and varying awards.  Improving consis-
tency may also lead to less litigation.249  Through their state guideline com-
mittees, states have expressed interest in increased federal guidance on
complex families.250  Given federal involvement and investment in child sup-
port, states should not be forced to haphazardly handle child support for
complex families.  The federal government should state its goals for multiple
families and should be clear that existing families should not be harmed by
the birth of new children.
In the face of this federal silence, several states have created mecha-
nisms or methods to respond to multiple families.  A handful of examples
illustrate this point.  North Dakota has a specific provision for multiple fam-
ily cases in which the court crafts a hypothetical order for all of the obligor’s
children whether or not all of the children are before the court.251  New
Jersey permits a court to review all past orders concerning the obligor.252
Texas provides two methods for computing support for children in more than
one household: one method allows for hypothetical awards, and the other
applies a percentage to the obligor’s net resources based upon the number of
children in existence and the number of children before the court.253  In the
majority of the states that designate a process for multiple families, the pro-
vision applies only where the nonresident parent has a subsequent child that
FORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., EVALUATION OF CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES, vol. I, ch. 3, §§ 2.1.1–2.1.2 (1996), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/
pubs/1996/reports/gdl/index.html.
248 Disparities exist between models, particularly for low-income families. See Mari-
anne Takas, Improving Child Support Guidelines: Can Simple Formulas Address Com-
plex Families? 26 FAM. L.Q. 171, 177–78 (1992) (demonstrating that neither income-
shares nor percentage-of-income models avoid pushing a party into poverty in multiple
families); see also Ellman, supra note 26, at 161 app. A (comparing outcomes of state R
guidelines).
249 Cf. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 247, vol. I, ch. 3, § 3.2.2 R
(noting that Delaware found that factoring in multiple orders led to litigation).
250 See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., EVALUATION OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, pt. 1 (1996), www.acf.hhs.gov/pro-
grams/cse/pubs/1996/reports/gdl/v2pt1.htm (noting that “[t]he issue of multiple families
was perhaps the most popular topic for the [state] guideline review committees”).
251 N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-06.1 (2003).
252 N.J. STAT. ANN. app. 9-A (1995).
253 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.128–129 (1995).
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lives with the parent.254  Frequently, the parent is entitled to an income de-
duction based upon a percentage of what the child support order would be
for the subsequent child.255  Connecticut also has an expansive definition of
income and, while not counting the income of new partners or spouses, al-
lows for a deviation from a presumptive child support award if the new
partner or spouse’s contributions have led the parent to “experience[ ] an
extraordinary reduction of his or her living expenses as a direct result of
such contributions or gift.”256  In Montana, “if a person with a subsequent
family has income from overtime or a second job, that income is presumed
to be for the use of the subsequent family” and is not included as income to
determine support for the prior family.257  These examples demonstrate that
states have taken a variety of approaches to handling multiples families,
without explicit or uniform policy goals.
Some states account for the poverty of either the children or the obligor.
In Kansas, the “multiple-family application” is discretionary if the child
support amount ordered would be below the poverty level.258  One considera-
tion in the Hawaii guidelines is the need “[t]o balance the standard of living
of both parents and child and avoid placing any below the poverty level
whenever possible.”259  Other states are more concerned with the poverty of
the obligor.  Pennsylvania only permits a reduction for new children if the
cumulative support awards exceed half the obligor’s monthly net income.260
Pennsylvania is explicit that “in no event should either a first or latter family
receive preference” and allows a proportional reduction of child support ob-
254 In this sense, the multiple family adjustment is meant to capture only the subset of
parents who cohabitate with the subsequent children. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-
9208 (2007).  An exception is Montana, which allows a deduction at fifty percent of the
child support award regardless of where the child lives. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 37.62.110
(2007) (allowing a deduction for “an amount equal to one-half of the primary child sup-
port allowance . . . for the number of other children for whom no support order exists.
These include children who reside with the parent as well as children who do not.”).
255 In Indiana, the percentage changes depending on the number of children. IND.
CODE ANN., Child Support Rules and Guidelines, Guideline 3 cmt. 3 (1989) (one child is
0.935%, two children 0.903%, three children 0.878%, and four children 0.863%).  D.C.
allows a parent to receive an income deduction for new children, but only for those
children living with the parent and only seventy-five percent of the hypothetical child
support obligation. D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(d)(5) (2008).
256 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 46b-215a-3 (2005). The Connecticut guidelines were re-
cently revised to require an income deduction for the needs of subsequent children and to
eliminate the deviation; this deduction only applies in defending against a proposed mod-
ification. Id. § 46b-215(a)(f)(2)(E), pmbl.  California also allows the income of a new
spouse or partner to be included in limited circumstances. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057.5
(West 2008) (allowing income where excluding it would lead to extreme and severe hard-
ship to any child subject to the child support award).
257 MONT. ADMIN. R. § 37.62.106 (2007).  In Montana, all children are considered
when modifying awards for new children, and minor adjustments are preferred. Id.
§ 37.62.146(3).
258 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-9208 (2007).
259 HAW. CODE R. § 576D-7(a)(7) (2007).
260 PA. R.C.P. 1910.16-7(a) (2008).
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ligations when the obligor has multiple families.261  By contrast, D.C. allows
a downward deviation if, upon evaluating the standard of living of the custo-
dial parent, it would be higher than that of the obligor because of child
support received from a non-joint child.262  This variety of state methods for
handling multiple families demonstrates the inconsistent approaches to pov-
erty in multiple families.
The issue of multiple families is frequently “underground” because it is
handled at the distribution rather than the front-end of guideline implementa-
tion.  A state child support enforcement agency may have an order of prior-
ity of how to distribute child support where there are multiple family
orders.263  Even less public, states may provide guidance to employers who
receive multiple income-withholding orders.264  The underground nature of
the issue of multiple families absolves states of the obligation to be explicit
about the policy choices that they are making in allocating resources among
multiple families.
Child support policy should account for complex families in the child
support goals and laws.  Although neither federal child support laws nor
goals have addressed how to handle existing and subsequent children, im-
portant policy questions should be answered.  What is the outcome that we
would like for families like those described above?  What goals are we try-
ing to meet?  Which children would we like to raise above the poverty line?
Should they all have the same standard of living?  How do we decide?
Should Felicia, Jake, and Beatrice receive the same amount?  Should that
amount be the same as Sam and Bettie’s?  What if J.T.’s payments have the
ability to raise one set of children, Felicia and Jake, out of poverty, but not
the other set?  How do we decide which family should receive more child
support?  Under the current regime, Anna’s income would not be legally
significant, but should we look at Anna’s income in deciding Peter’s support
obligation for Beatrice?  Should Maryann or Beatrice benefit from Peter
forming a union with someone who has financial resources?  Should what
Peter pays to Maryann have an effect on what J.T. pays to Maryann?265  Lim-
261 Id. 1910.16-7(b).  In the sense that any reduction harms the first family, it is
slightly disingenuous to say that there is no family preference.  This statute is also note-
worthy for its assumptions about new families, as PA. R.C.P. 1910.16-7(a) repeatedly
mentions first marriage and remarriage.
262 D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(p)(6) (2008).
263 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.467(6)–(7) (2007) (giving priority based on
payoff hierarchy and using proportionality); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:25-5-351(f)
(2008) (stating that the unit prorates and allocates collections to each family based on
each family’s total current support due).
264 This issue may arise when an employer receives several income-withholding or-
ders, the total of which exceeds the percentage of income that can be withheld according
to laws such as the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) (2000).
Texas, for example, provides that in this situation, the withheld income should be divided
equally among children. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 158.207(b) (Vernon 2002).
265 Other issues may be relevant to deciding the child support amounts owed by Peter
and J.T.  For example, we may want to know more about Peter or J.T.’s fathering (apart
from financial obligations) or about the actual child-rearing expenditures for all of the
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ited equalization seeks to fill the gap in the federal goals by providing gui-
dance on these questions.  By providing well-crafted child support goals that
can be embodied in state guidelines, limited equalization affirms the neces-
sity of examining complex families within the child support system, while
favoring first families.
VI. FIVE NEW GOALS OF CHILD SUPPORT TO RECOGNIZE
FAMILY COMPLEXITY
The federal government remains a primary way to provide financially
for children, but any improvements must assume greater complexity than the
current system.  Complex families should not be pushed into the existing
framework, as the complexity of the issues suggests hard choices and a lack
of uniform solutions.266  Child support policy should be restructured based
on the realities of complex families, especially families living in poverty.
The goals of child support should be:  (1) to make an explicit policy choice
about supporting multiple families in favor of existing families; (2) to recog-
nize the demographics of the families that need child support; (3) to include
an expanded definition of parenthood and the duty of support; (4) to increase
poverty prevention; and (5) to increase attention to gender equality.  In mak-
ing an explicit policy choice in favor of existing families, limited equaliza-
tion helps to answer the question of who bears the cost of subsequent
families.  These focal points provide guidance to the states in determining
how to allocate resources among multiple families and provide guideposts
by which to measure future revisions to child support guidelines.
In implementing a policy of limited equalization, there must be careful
analysis of how parents with multiple children with different partners fare in
the current child support system.  Currently, state agencies are required to
maintain records of applications for support, the location of noncustodial
parents, actions to establish paternity and obtain and enforce support, the
costs incurred in such actions, the amount and sources of support collections
and the distribution of these collections fees charged or paid for support
enforcement services, and any other administrative costs.267  States are re-
quired to make reports each fiscal quarter on their collections and on their
expenditures; however, although states are required to file extensive annual
reports, there are no multiple family reporting requirements.268  Federal regu-
families.  We might also be concerned about incentives that are being created to form
new unions or to have more children.
266 See BRITO, supra note 141, at 1, 15–20 (discussing various state approaches to R
resolving the “competing tensions” inherent in addressing cases of complex families).
But see Linda Ferguson, Family, Social Inequalities, and the Persuasive Force of Inter-
personal Obligations, 22 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 61, 75–81 (2008) (describing child
support decisions made under a Canadian federal support guideline).
267 45 C.F.R. § 302.15(a) (2008).
268 See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT COLLECTION REPORT (2007), available at http://
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lations should require more data collection relevant to multiple families, and
states should also analyze child support orders for multiple families.  This
data will ensure that any policy of limited equalization reflects the realities
of those the child support system is meant to serve.269
A. Limited Equalization Expresses a Policy Choice in Favor
of Existing Families
The first new child support goal makes an explicit choice about how to
allocate resources in complex families.  Limited equalization recognizes the
need to provide adequate resources for all children without exacerbating the
incentives for a nonresident parent to reduce payments to the first family.
Child support is based on income, and there is frequently a limit to the num-
ber of children a parent’s income can support.  Blanket “equalization” thus
means that the prior families bear the cost of a parent’s subsequent families.
The cost of having subsequent families should be borne by parents
without jeopardizing the living standards of the first family or existing fami-
lies.  First or existing children should receive a preference because nonresi-
dent fathers are less likely to pay child support when they have new
children; there is empirical support for the idea that fathers “swap” families
and may adjust their child support payments informally to account for new
biological children.270  This shift in resources decreases the standard of living
of nonresident children and may leave them without sufficient resources.271
Although some child support reductions should be allowed to account for the
needs of subsequent children, any income deduction should only apply to
child support orders for which they are in compliance.272  Limited equaliza-
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/forms/34A.pdf (quarterly report on collections); OFFICE
OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM FINANCIAL REPORT (2007), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cse/forms/396A.pdf (quarterly report of expenditures); OFFICE OF CHILD SUP-
PORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCMENT
ANNUAL DATA REPORT (2005) available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/forms/
OMB-0970-0177.pdf (annual reporting).
269 I recognize that this is just one solution of many; there are many possible ways to
address complex families in child support, and we should be eager to generate alterna-
tives.  One approach is to try limited equalization on an experimental basis in some
states.
270 Manning, Stewart & Smock, supra note 22, at 119 (suggesting that biological R
parenthood and coresidence are important factors in predicting whether fathers will
“swap” families).
271 See id. at 120; see also William S. Aquilino, Impact of Family Structure on Paren-
tal Attitudes Toward the Economic Support of Adult Children Over the Transition to
Adulthood, 26 J. FAM. ISSUES 143, 161 (2005) (family structure has long-term effects on
parents’ willingness to provide financial assistance to their children); Susan D. Stewart,
Boundary Ambiguity in Stepfamilies, 26 J. FAM. ISSUES 1002, 1024 (2005) (suggesting
that nonresident children may be most hurt when parents take on additional parenting
roles).
272 It is also worth considering whether or not a new guideline should calculate the
income for residential and non-residential parents differently, particularly where those
categories so closely track gender.  While at first blush, income-shares guidelines, in
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tion looks at the actual needs and available support for all of the children
rather than enforcing a blanket policy of either “equalization” or “first fam-
ily first.”
Limited equalization may be more in keeping with what courts actually
do in multiple families; the “first family first” preference is often rendered
meaningless by deviations and deductions.  An ABA study in 1996 revealed
the frequent use of downward deviations; a second household was a com-
mon reason given for deviations.273  However, the amount of deviation varies
from state to state.  For example, the range of average downward deviation
in the study was between $48 to $232 per month for subsequent obligations
and from $17 to $185 per month for prior orders.274  In another review of
five states with different guideline models, the amount ordered for the subse-
quent child was always smaller than for the first, but the percentage by
which it was smaller ranged from eight to twenty-five percent.275  The fre-
quent use of deviations often results in inconsistent and disproportionately
low awards for the existing family or families, particularly where a nonresi-
dent parent resides with subsequent children.  Deviations and adjustments to
child support should not be used to undermine parental obligations as a con-
sequence of incurring new responsibilities.
Returning to our previous example of the blended families, we should
examine the hardships that would be caused to all the families in allocating
the parents’ limited resources to Felicia, Jake, Sam, and Bettie.  As demon-
strated in the hypothetical child support calculations, subsequent families
ordinarily receive less child support, but only if one assumes that the first
family has an existing child support order and that the obligor does not re-
side with the subsequent family or families.  This result embodies the policy
of “first family first.”  Where the obligor resides with a subsequent family,
however, the first family’s award is ordinarily significantly reduced.  If Feli-
cia and Jake were accustomed to receiving $550 monthly from J.T., they
would experience a significant hardship if their award were reduced by half.
On the other hand, if Sam and Bettie are not living with J.T., and their
mother, Janette, seeks support, they may suffer a hardship if they only re-
ceive the standard minimum of $50, or a similarly low award.276  In allocat-
ing J.T.’s income, the hardships facing each family should be accounted for,
with an eye toward preserving the status quo for the existing family.
which both residential and non-residential parents’ incomes are considered, seem “fair,”
we should research the harms to residential parents of this approach, particularly where
most residential parents are mothers.
273 See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 247, vol. I, ch. 2, § 3 & R
tbls. 2, 3 & 4 (second household is the most common reason for deviations after agree-
ment between the parties).
274 Id. ch. 3, § 2.3.1.
275 CASPAR, supra note 15, at 12 (examining several different guideline models, in- R
cluding percentage-of-obligor, income-shares, and Melson formula).
276 There may be a difference between an award being lowered (i.e., re-allocation)
and a low award being instituted.
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States may develop numerous mechanisms to weigh the hardships to
multiple families.  After analyzing these hardships, one method of allocation
is to provide a percentage of income to each child or each family.277  In
limited equalization, this percentage of income could be based on the actual
need of the children and other available resources, or the number and se-
quencing of children (where existing children are given a preference).  To
maintain support for first or existing families, existing children should be
entitled to a higher baseline percentage.  Alternatively, there could be a
baseline percentage of income under which the award for preexisting fami-
lies could not fall.  Once the baseline for the preexisting family is met, the
family, or families, with the most need would receive a higher percentage of
the obligor’s income.  Moreover, guidelines may include a preference for
minor adjustments to existing child support awards so that families will not
face drastic changes in their child support awards.278  One reason to give a
preference to existing children is that the hardships caused by a significant
child support reduction, and the resulting decrease in standard of living, are
more severe than those of having a low initial child support amount ordered.
Limited equalization as a policy goal attempts to protect existing chil-
dren from bearing the brunt of new family formation.  Because first or ex-
isting families are more likely to receive a child support reduction,
particularly where the subsequent children live with the parent, we should
tip the scales in favor of the first family or existing family.279  At the same
time, in looking to the available resources for children in multiple families,
limited equalization allows courts to examine the actual living situation of
the children and strive to keep all children out of poverty.
B. Child Support Models and Guidelines Should Be Based on Accurate
Assessments of Family Demographics and the Experiences
of Complex Families
The second new goal of child support is to serve the families reflected
in the actual demographics of family composition.  Recognizing family com-
plexity may include, for example, assisting children without preference to
whether or not their parents cohabitated.  Relatedly, child support should not
277 Some states already follow this approach, generally based on the number of chil-
dren.  Texas provides a percentage of income. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.128
(1995).  Delaware provides a complicated percentage system designed to give preference
to the needs of the first family. See KUHN, supra note 239, at 13. R
278 See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. § 37.62.146 (2007).  When modifying an existing or-
der, the support obligation is calculated first considering all children and then considering
no subsequent children. Id.  If both calculations result in an increase or decrease in the
award, the smaller of the two calculations is granted. Id.  If one calculation results in an
increase and the other in a decrease, then no modification is granted. Id.
279 One possibility is to provide less of a deduction for subsequent children who live
with the obligor.
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aim to offset the cost of family dissolution because many families subject to
child support orders have not cohabitated.280
Rather than basing child support on the economic model of a nuclear
dissolving family, economic models should be based on more realistic as-
sessments of families requiring child support.  Because states are already
required to provide economic analysis in support of their guidelines, this is a
relatively easy structural change to make.  The guidelines implementing lim-
ited equalization should simply have more components, require more infor-
mation from the parents about their living situation, dependents, and
resources, and require the state to weigh this information in setting support
orders.281  Admittedly, these new guidelines would be more complex than
existing guidelines, and would require the state to weigh all such informa-
tion in setting support amounts.  This complexity, however, is a natural and
necessary result of addressing the needs of complex families.
C. Child Support Should Include an Expanded View of Whose
Resources “Count”
The third new child support goal is that laws should reflect an expanded
definition of parenting and the duty of support.  Until all family laws reflect
the reality of parenting and formally expand parenting definitions, child sup-
port laws should consider more of the resources available to the family, even
where there is not a legal duty of support.282  As long as a parent has the
means to provide child support, guidelines should examine ways for that
support to be “counted” in a guideline calculation.  For example, a new
guideline should include an expansive definition of “income,” which should
include the resources available from other cohabitants, parents, and new
partners.283  Examining available resources requires obtaining information
280 The concept of offsetting sounds worthy — we should make sure that children do
not bear the brunt of establishing a second home when a household divides.  Even for
dividing families, however, this goal is empty rhetoric because the guidelines do not
focus on equalization of standards of living and are purely based on the parents’ income
rather than living expenses or the cost of setting up several households.
281 For example, the standard guideline program often asks only for the number of
dependents, while a new guideline may want to know more about the dependents and
other resources to which they have access.
282 The definitions of parenting for custodial purposes do not need to match the defi-
nition of parenting for child support purposes. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 7, at 320–22 R
(advocating the opposite: a tolerant approach to the benefits and a strict approach to the
obligations that accompany family membership).
283 Income should include the following: salary, wages, overtime, commissions, bo-
nuses, royalties, dividend income, pension income, interest income, trust income, annuity
income, Social Security benefits, workers compensation income, unemployment insur-
ance benefits, disability insurance benefits, veterans benefits, capital gains, income from
interest in an estate or life insurance, alimony or maintenance, lottery or gambling win-
nings, prizes or awards, rental income, earned income tax credits, monetary gifts, income
from self-employment, military base, and special pay.  This list combines the income
required in the Maryland, Massachusetts, and Hawaii guidelines. MORGAN, supra note 6, R
at B-75 to -76, C-8 to -9, C-23.
\\server05\productn\H\HLG\32-1\HLG104.txt unknown Seq: 49  2-FEB-09 13:22
2009] Multiple Families, Multiple Goals, Multiple Failures 157
about all of the resources, including income, of other adults in the home.
Accomplishing this goal would also require thoughtful attention to how
courts obtain and evaluate the information necessary to make decisions, as
well as to how frequently to review or revisit child support determinations.
Accomplishing this goal would likely require more reliance on judicial dis-
cretion, which in turn requires high levels of oversight to ensure judicial
accountability.284
States should experiment with different methods of determining whose
resources should be included in child support guidelines and how far the
vision of the family should be expanded.  For example, states may include
the contributions of grandparents, family friends, or caregivers, and the re-
sources of new intimate partners, whether or not they live with the chil-
dren.285  Considering the full range of resources available to parents and
children may be particularly relevant to and helpful for children living in or
near poverty.  This expanded vision of resources should also be relevant in
the hardship and poverty analysis.
Based on the sample hypothetical family, a new guideline might in-
clude a mechanism for examining who is providing for Sam and Bettie and
for Felicia and Jake, regardless of whether or not there is a legal duty of
support.  Considering the living circumstances of and income available to
each party and to each of the parties’ partners acknowledges the interrelated-
ness of the lives of multiple families.  For example, if Peter paid the $775
monthly that he owed for the support of Beatrice to Maryann, Maryann may
not need the full amount that she would ordinarily receive from J.T. to keep
all three of her children out of poverty.  In this scenario, J.T. could thus more
equally allocate his income among his four children.  Likewise, if J.T. were
being supported by others or benefiting from someone else’s income, he may
not need all of his self-serve reserve and thus might be able to allocate more
of his income to his children.  If Maryann had access to additional resources,
these would also be factored into the child support guideline calculation, as
would Anna’s income.  Examining the actual resources available to the par-
ents would allow for a more realistic assessment of the children’s needs and
would provide more flexibility in determining individual awards.
284 There is a tension between rules (via guidelines) and judicial discretion.  One of
the original justifications for guidelines was that judicial discretion led to inconsistent and
unfair results that frequently favored non-residential fathers.  At the same time, the state
guideline commissions that develop and review guidelines are often composed of private
bar attorneys whose interests may not be aligned with poor families.  I thank Daniel
Hatcher for reminding me of this tension, which highlights the need for proactive change
on behalf of multiple families and families living in poverty.
285 Both California and Connecticut have limited provisions for considering new part-
ner income. See sources cited supra note 256.  States may wish to experiment with R
whether to count third parties’ actual contribution or available resources.
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D. Child Support Should Seek to Prevent and Alleviate Poverty
The fourth goal of a new child support policy should be to improve the
financial situation of children and alleviate poverty.  Because child support
has been offered as a solution to welfare dependency, child support policy
should explicitly seek to prevent poverty where welfare fails to alleviate
poverty.  This goal also extends to those families that are on welfare, be-
cause leaving welfare is not synonymous with leaving poverty.286  As part of
this focus, child support policy-makers should recognize that family dissolu-
tion is not the only cause of children’s poverty.287  Child support is unlikely
to lift the poorest families out of poverty, particularly where nonresident
parents lack the ability to pay;288 however, there is some evidence that child
support can alleviate poverty, even if it may need to be combined with other
sources.289  Limited equalization seeks to expand the income available to
poor families in order to provide a wider safety net than currently provided
by child support or welfare policies.  Specific attention to poverty prevention
may result in increased child support awards that could raise some families
out of poverty without increasing the financial hardships to individual
parents.290
Child support guidelines should be developed with the most financially
needy families in mind.  The federal government should reconsider how to
use the resources of the OCSE and state agencies, since strong child support
enforcement does not generally assist low-income families.291  As part of this
goal, the federal government should also reconsider the link between welfare
law and child support law.  At a minimum, child support laws should not be
used to punish poor mothers or to enforce a pro-marriage agenda as a
286 Daniel Meyer & Marcia Cancian, Economic Well-Being Following an Exit from
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 60 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 479, 491 (1998)
(“Welfare reforms targeted to reduce caseloads may do relatively little to enhance
broader measures of economic success.”).
287 See Garrison, supra note 162, at 159 (guidelines fail to avert poverty because they R
were not designed with this goal in mind).
288 See Daniel Meyer & Judi Bartfeld, Compliance with Child Support Orders in
Divorce Cases, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 201, 210 (1996) (finding that greater ability to
pay is associated with higher compliance, and a “burden of the orders” is not related to
compliance until more than thirty-five percent of the income is owed).  According to one
small sample study, only three percent of obligors had the ability to pay but willfully
failed to do so. SORENSON, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 23, at 5. R
289 See Daniel R. Meyer & Mei-Chen Hu, A Note on the Antipoverty Effectiveness of
Child Support Among Mother-Only Families, 34 J. HUM. RESOURCES 225, 230 (1999)
(finding that child support only brought six to seven percent of mothers above the poverty
line in a 1995 population survey).
290 This does not mean that there will be higher orders across the board.  In conjunc-
tion with the third goal of expanding financial responsibility for children, attention to
poverty prevention may require shifting resources and imposing child support obligations
on more people.
291 See supra Part IV.A.
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method of alleviating poverty.292 Additionally, the federal government
should make adjustments, such as increasing the state pass-through for wel-
fare recipients, to increase the perceived legitimacy of the child support
system.293
One question is whether new child support guidelines should treat high-
and low-income families differently.294  Typically there is a certain income
level above which the guidelines no longer apply.295  This standard may be
worth continuing as long as the new goals of child support are met.  If the
child support model is truly geared to complex low- and middle-income
families, there may be reasons for the guidelines not to apply presumptively
in high-income cases.296  Although limited equalization could include a self-
serve reserve for low-income families, the actual expenses and support sys-
tem of the obligor should be relevant.297
As part of poverty prevention for multiple families, child support goals
should focus on children.  Current child support law typically focuses on
parental equality, opportunity, and standards of living, rather than on the
experience and needs of children.298  Some state guidelines are concerned
292 Disassociating welfare from child support is one way to escape some of the ste-
reotypes about women that are promoted and exacerbated by our current child support
regime.  Proposing an overhaul of the welfare system is outside the scope of this Article.
293 See WALLER, supra note 139, at 140–41.  Waller also recommends supplementing R
child support payments with public funds, guaranteeing a publicly funded minimum, and
helping noncustodial fathers find employment. Id. at 141–43.
Because of assignment rules, the government has claim to any unpaid support while a
parent receives welfare benefits.  See sources cited supra note 64.  Once the government R
has collected this money, a small amount “passes through” to the parent; a state pass-
through is the money the state turns over to the parent receiving public benefits.  See
Turetsky, supra note 59, at 408; Hatcher, supra note 122, at 1053. R
294 Some state guidelines have different polices and practices for high-income and
low-income cases.  See, e.g., Kathleen A. Hogan, Child Support in High Income Cases,
17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 349, 358 (2001) (discussing trusts and other mecha-
nisms in high-income cases); Rosettenstein, supra note 151, at 959 (discussing stock R
options in high-income families and their relation to child support).  Although there may
be a persuasive rationale for treating low- and high-income families differently, “[i]t
would give a sorry moral statement if one’s parental duties evaporated if one only de-
scended to a low enough income bracket.”  Minow, supra note 7, at 309. R
295 See MORGAN, supra note 6, § 4.07(b) (explaining how courts handle high-income R
cases).
296 Moreover, if one parent has high resources, the ability to support multiple children
may be less of an issue.  This premise, however, assumes compliance and high awards for
all children of high-income parents.
297 There is a wide range of self-serve reserves, ranging from a few hundred dollars to
over $1000 per month. MORGAN, supra note 6, at B-190 (Supp. 2004). R
298 The focus on parents is embodied in the Advisory Panel on Child Support Guide-
lines. See WILLIAMS, supra note 109, pt. I, at 4–5 (cited in MORGAN, supra note 6, R
§ 1.02(e) (2003 Supp.), and in ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.04(1)–(5)).  Both of R
these sources state several policy goals concerning parents’ relationships to each other.
As an example, section 3.04(1)(b) of the ALI PRINCIPLES refers to “impoverishing” par-
ents, but not children, which reflects a concern between parents, rather than between
children. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 3.04(b). R
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with “fairness” to the obligor over the needs of children.299  Research indi-
cates, however, that “few fathers fall below the poverty line because of the
amount of support they are ordered to pay or the amount they actually
pay.”300  As part of the goal of alleviating poverty, child support should fo-
cus on the needs of the children, rather than their parents, and be framed
around the experience of low-income families.  This effort could include es-
tablishing an adequacy threshold for awards, articulating factors relevant to
the minimum support amount, and outlining factors relevant to allocating
resources above the baseline.
Looking at the previous example, a new child support guideline imple-
menting poverty prevention would make allocations in light of how much
support each family requires to remain out of poverty.  If Felicia and Jake
would be pushed (further) into poverty by reducing their child support award
in half, the smallest possible reduction should be made to their award.
Where J.T. resides with Sam and Bettie’s mother, Janette, and has access to
more resources, the poverty reduction analysis may favor Felicia and Jake.
Where all non-residential families are poor, and possibly receiving pub-
lic benefits, the allocation question is more challenging.  It seems unfair for
Sam and Bettie’s award to be significantly lower than Felicia and Jake’s,
especially where Sam and Bettie’s award, at $50, is far below the poverty
line.  It may seem equally unproductive, however, to reduce the award for
Felicia and Jake if, as a result, the awards for Felicia, Jake, Sam, and Bettie
would not keep either family out of poverty.  Full equalization in non-resi-
dent families — which would mean splitting J.T.’s available income in half
— would provide only $275 per family, which is probably insufficient to
keep either family out of poverty.  Thus, under full equalization, both fami-
lies would likely qualify for welfare.  Where there are not enough resources
for all families — even with an expanded view of whose resources count —
limited equalization gives a preference to existing families so that existing
children will not experience a significant decrease in their standard of living.
Nonetheless, limited equalization should attempt to keep all families out of
poverty by balancing their needs with their available resources.
299 See MORGAN, supra note 6, § 3.04 (1)(b); see also D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(p)(6) R
(2008) (permitting a lower child support award if the recipient’s standard of living would
be higher than the parent with the duty of support); Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Two
“ICS” of the 2001 Louisiana Child Support Guidelines: Economics and Politics, 62 LA.
L. REV. 709, 732 (2002) (discussing testimony about guideline revisions which focused
on fairness to the obligor).
300 Marcia Cancian & Daniel Meyer, Fathers of Children Receiving Welfare: Can
They Provide More Child Support?, 78 SOC. SERV. REV. 179, 182–83 (2004) (citing re-
search literature about fathers’ poverty and suggesting that their income needs to be
increased).
\\server05\productn\H\HLG\32-1\HLG104.txt unknown Seq: 53  2-FEB-09 13:22
2009] Multiple Families, Multiple Goals, Multiple Failures 161
E. Child Support Should Advance Gender Equality
The final goal of child support should be to foster gender equality.
Gender equality is important in child support because, as part of family law
and policy, child support laws are part of the legal tradition of discriminating
against women.301  There are numerous ways to examine gender in the child
support system, including focusing on gender equality in the application of
child support guidelines and in judicial decision-making, minimizing the
ways in which women are forced into dependency, and limiting stereotypes
based on gender.  Each of these prisms provides a way for child support
policy to be more attentive to gender.
States may wish to try different methods in order to achieve some of
these objectives.  One approach is to encourage child support laws to mini-
mize gender roles, and to develop and monitor child support laws so that
they are non-discriminatory in effect.  A child support policy that examines
gender should also ensure that children of mothers with multiple families are
not treated less preferentially than children of fathers with multiple families.
Additionally, a child support policy should not inadvertently perpetuate false
assumptions about multiple parents and partners.302
Although child support laws are likely to remain gender-neutral, gender
neutrality may obscure the reality that women typically receive child support
and that “the child support regime is . . . based on gendered ideas of family
life.”303  While being mindful of not reinforcing stereotypes, federal and
state governments should examine how child support laws and policies af-
fect obligors and obligees differently.  The current gender-neutral regime
often masks the important ways that mothers are treated differently than
nonresident fathers.  For example, in some states, obligors may receive a
deduction for subsequent children, but obligees do not receive a deduction
for their subsequent children.304  In effect, this different treatment allows ob-
ligors to receive an offset for having new children while the non-obligor
receives no comparable benefit.  Because fathers comprise the majority of
obligors, they receive preferential treatment.  Even as child support laws are
301 See generally Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475
(1999) (describing the insights feminism has brought to family law, including contesting
privacy and neutrality).
302 It may help to gather data on the frequency of multiple partners vis-a`-vis mothers
and fathers.  The standard paradigm assumes a father who leaves a “first family” and has
children with another woman, but empirical data could confirm or undermine this percep-
tion.  The federal government should also examine child support payments for a correla-
tion between support payments and the gender of the children.
303 JOSEPHSON, supra note 18, at 143–44.  As Susan Moller Okin has noted in discuss- R
ing gender neutrality historically, “gender-neutral terms frequently obscure the fact that
so much of the real experience of ‘persons,’ so long as they live in gender-structured
societies, does in fact depend on what sex they are.” SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE,
GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 11 (1989).
304 See discussion supra Part V.A.
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based on outdated assumptions about the roles of women, the gendered real-
ity of who receives child support suggests that gender cannot be ignored.
Gender equality as a component of limited equalization might suggest
examining the burdens or obligations of J.T. and Peter as compared to Mary-
ann to make sure that Maryann is not being punished for her life choices.
For example, if Maryann receives public benefits, she may face punitive or
restrictive policies that J.T. does not experience.  For instance, Maryann may
face family cap policies as a consequence of having additional children, but
J.T. would not experience any consequences as a result of his decision to
have more children.  Similarly, if the child support awards are so low that
Maryann alone is responsible for making ends meet, she is forced into the
sacrificing role of mother and low-wage worker.  As part of striving for gen-
der equity, child support laws and policies should not force Maryann to bear
a disproportionate share of child-rearing responsibilities.  Accordingly, a
limited equalization approach advocates examining the effects of child sup-
port guidelines as applied to Maryann, J.T., and Peter to ensure that all par-
ents share in the burdens of having subsequent families.305
Attention to gender equality is especially important in developing child
support policy for multiple families.  Because child support is a key compo-
nent of family law policy, gender equality is an important goal for child
support.  Any of the frameworks described above for examining gender
would likely improve child support policy.  In looking at the reality of multi-
ple families, limited equalization provides an opportunity to focus on the
role that gender plays in child support.
* * *
These five goals provide a foundation for a new child support policy
that is centered on the lives of multiple families and families living in pov-
erty, and aims to actually meet the needs of children.  Implementing a new
child support policy based on these five focal points provides an opportunity
for states to experiment with how best to achieve these goals.  As part of its
involvement in regulating state child support guidelines, the federal govern-
ment should evaluate those guidelines to ascertain whether or not the five
new child support goals are being accomplished.  Developing a method to
account for multiple families, especially low-income families, is crucial, but
all families — not just low-income or complex families — would benefit
from a new child support guideline with the above-stated goals.306
305 For example, if J.T. receives an income deduction for his subsequent children,
Maryann should also receive credit for her subsequent children.
306 Some states have enacted a multiple families guideline, which may be more politi-
cally feasible than writing new guidelines for all families.
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CONCLUSION
Current child support goals and laws assume a model of the family that
is inaccurate and fails to account for family complexity.  As a result, the
goals of federal child support — fiscal savings, economic well-being, and
parental involvement — are unrealistic and unattainable.  Reviewing the
failures of the federal child support goals and laws demonstrates the
problems with the current child support regime as applied to all families; the
multiple family lens highlights the need for changes across the board.  These
failed and flawed goals should be replaced with goals that reflect the needs
of families today: an explicit policy decision about supporting multiple fami-
lies in favor of existing families; recognition of the demographics of the
families that need child support; an expanded definition of parenting and the
duty of support; increased attention to poverty prevention; and an increased
focus on gender equality.  Particularly in light of welfare’s failures, new
child support guidelines should be developed to favor existing families while
allocating resources across families more equitably.  This new theory of lim-
ited equalization requires states to examine the resources available for all of
the families, examine the hardships that would be caused to the families by
reallocation, and attempt to keep all families out of poverty.
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